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Abstract

Abortion and the Jewish Ethical Tradition:
Is There a Single Authentic Position
Larry V. Amsel
1988

The last decade has seen a significant

increase in the

publishing of English language texts and articles on Jewish
bioethics.
religious

On the question of
law,

abortion in the Halakha,

many authors take a stringent position.

Jewish
They

allow abortion only in cases of serious medical danger to the
mother.

Moreover,

these authors claim that their position

correlates with a strict

interpretation of the Halakha.

Articles critical of this position have begun to appear.

We

review the literature and find that the stringent position is
not correlated simply to a strict
but

rather to a systematic bias

that

law.

interpretation of Jewish law,

in interpreting and applying

Possible sources of this bias are found in 1)

methodology of

interpretation 2)

ethical and theological

assumptions which do not necessarily represent
Jewish viewpoint and 3)

the institutional

contemporary Rabbinic decision making.
is

the

an authentic

forces that condition

We conclude that what

relevant to the debate on abortion is the dialectic method

of Halakha which is based on comparing new situations with
century old conclusions.
Instead,

There is no broad ethical

framwork.

the ethics of the Halakha are contained in an ongoing

discussion of

its cases.
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Chapter I
Introduction

Section 1.
A.

Background

Theology in Bioethics
Our starting point for this paper

contribution can the Jewish religious
contemporary abortion discussion?

is the question:

What

law make to the

We might wonder first:

what

role should any religious thought play in contemporary
formulations of bioethics.
In calling for an increased dialogue between secular
bioethics and theology E.

E.

Shelp^ points out that often

there is a religious or theological basis
bioethics.

We often ignore this,

however,

for our positions

in

either because we

believe ourselves to be totally rational secularists,

or

if we

acknowledge the religious component of our thinking we fail

to

develop these ideas:
in an effort to be persuasive on such grounds as
diverse persons can agree upon; often to introduce
theology becomes [we fear] a reason for one's secular
colleagues to discount what one might say about
medical ethics.2
Regardless of our position it becomes

important to excavate

the religious-theological components of our thinking.

If we

are professedly religious we need to be honest with ourselves
and our colleagues on how this affects our views of bioethics.
If on the other hand we claim to be secularists

it

even more important to examine our premises and

recognize how

strongly influenced our moral thinking

is perhaps

is by specifically

2

religious categories.

It is from this latter position that

this paper is written.
The philosopher MacIntyre has identified three tasks along
the road to the above goal:
First ... a clear statement of what difference it
makes to be a Jew or a Christian or a Moslem rather
than a secular thinker in morality generally.
Secondly ... a theological critique of secular
morality and culture ... Third [to clarify] what
bearing this has ... on specific problems which arise
from modern medicine.3
We will touch on each of these points as we move through
this paper.

The kind of

issues that are raised

in medical

ethics in general and the abortion debate in particular do not
seem to be solvable by the science of medicine
by the study of a secular ethics.

nor we believe

For they touch on the

meaning and value we attach to the very fact of our existence,
the fears we attach to end of our existence and the eternity we
experience in our encounter with others
predicament.

in the same

It is this that makes these issues so disturbing

in a secular world.

If we ignore religion the issues

in the guise of medicine.

resurface

The point we believe is that one can

have secular answers but one can’t avoid asking

religious

questions.
We also agree with MacIntyre that it is

important to

examine these issues from specific religious perspectives.

In

the abortion controversy especially there has often been a
melding together in the interest of
support this side or that.

"gathering the troops"

to

Pronouncements are made by

interfaith groups that may help promote one side of the debate

3

or the other but do

little to educate us about what the

particular traditions have had to say on the issue.

We need

the multiplicity of different views and we especially need to
preserve the history of each tradition's struggle with these
issues.

We are not the first generation to wonder.

In this paper we hope to contribute to this task from the
specific perspective of traditional Jewish law - the Halakha.
Referring to the abortion controversy the religious
B.

scholar G.

Halibard has written:
It is probable that this type of problem is ultimately
soluble only by reference to ethical and religious
criteria.
If so the Halakha is peculiarly fit to give
guidance since it is a fully developed legal system
with binding and persuasive precedents but interpreted
by Ecclesiastics with constant application of moral
consideration.
Returning to our original question then,

we hope to shed

some light on the methods

and content of the Jewish religious

law concerning abortion.

In particular we will

attempt to

refute what we believe has been a misrepresentation of this
tradition.

B.

First we need to establish some background.

Halakha - The Traditional Jewish Law
It

is certainly not possible to present

a

"Jewish" view of

abortion as the Jewish community is extremely diverse.
are four branches of Judaism:
and

reconstructionists;

main branches.
"Halakha,"
This

We will

orthodox,

conservative,

There
reform

and more divisions within each of
focus our

the traditional

interest,

however,

these

on the

and normative body of Jewish law.

is based on the Five Books of Moses as understood and

4

interpreted by the Talmud.

The Talmud consists

in the

redaction of what had been a thousand year tradition of
law" consisting

in turn of

texts and a broad
religious,

"oral

interpretations of the Biblical

legal system covering the whole gamut of

commercial,

family and social

law.

The Halakhic

tradition continues after the redaction of the Talmud with the
publishing of several codes of Jewish law,
attempt to organize the entire
perhaps most
decisions.

huge tomes which

legal corpus.

Finally and

importantly are the Responsa or Rabbinical
These are legal opinions written in response to

specific cases or questions presented to Rabbinical
authorities.
law"

This can be viewed as the equivalent of

in American jurisprudence.

The Responsa

"case

literature

continues to grow to the present day.
We focus on the Halakha because as the philosopher Ronald
Green has written,
self-confessedly

it

"forms the substance of

'Jewish1

point of view."

5

any
Similarly,

the

Judaic scholar Robert Gordis whose views are anything but
traditional has written:
No serious discussion on the nature of Judaism or of
its experience in the past, its condition in the
present or its prospects for the future can proceed
very far without the introduction of the term
Halakha.
Derived from the Hebrew root Halakha "go,
walk" it means "the way" and refers to the body of
Jewish law and practice by which the Jewish people has
been governed during its pilgrimage.^
Referring to MacIntyre's tasks,

it

is Halakha that

is

specific to the Jewish experience and makes the difference as
to a uniquely Jewish view.
The literature of Halakha has until
inaccessible to those untrained

recently been

in its scholarship.

It

is

5

written in either Hebrew or Aramaic,
difficult
however,

and finally it

its

is voluminous.

reasoning can be quite
The recent decade,

has seen an explosion in English language texts and

articles dealing with Jewish law and
and bioethics.

in particular with Halakha

It will therefore become possible for concepts

and methods of the Halakha to enter

into dialogue with other

ethical

In particular

and theological positions.

possible to do the kind of

scholarship involved

it becomes

in this paper.

While every branch of Judaism looks upon the Halakha with
great

respect

groups accept
religious

and as a source of moral

inspiration,

different

its authority as the normative and binding

law to a varying degree.

Thus the orthodox accept

Halakha as divine and binding while the reform and
reconstructionist see it more in historical terms
source for their present beliefs.

as the early

The conservative movement

tends to fall between these extremes.
In many areas of

religious observance,

proscriptions or observance of the Sabbath,
movement

for example,

dietary

the orthodox

and especially the ultra-orthodox sects will

rightfully claim what
hypothesis.

That

I wish to call the correlation

is that the stringency of

their views and

practice concerning these laws are directlv correlated with the
strictness of their interpretation of
classical Halakha.

and adherence to the

An orthodox person who refuses to use

electricity on Sabbath or who will not drink milk which has not
been certified kosher can very legitimately cite Halakhic texts
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to prove that his belief

and practice are closer to the

traditional

law than his conservative or

This claim,

however,

abortion.

reform compatriots.

has also been made with regard to

In an issue as complex as

abortion,

however,

the

Halakha simply does not present a monolithic and consistent
view.

Nonetheless,

the correlation claim has been articulated

forcefully and is widely believed in a simplified form:
more authentically traditional one is the more
abortion they will be.

the

restrictive on

It will be the major task, of

this paper

to refute this claim.

Section 2.
A.

Plan of the Work - Evidence and Arguments

The Stringent Orthodox Position and the Correlation Claim
As we will demonstrate throughout this paper,

of

abortion in the classical Halakhic

complex and controversial,

the question

literature is very

probably reflecting highly

polarized positions dating back fifteen centuries.

However,

within the recent expansion of English language papers on
Jewish bioethics,

a stringent position has dominated the

discussion on abortion.
most

In examining the

likely to first encounter this view.

position permits
the mother's

literature one is
This stringent

abortion only in cases of serious danger to

life.

Moreover these authors have insisted that their position is
the only "authentic” Jewish view.

They have bolstered this

view by claiming that the stringency of their position
correlates directly with a strict

and

legalistic reading of

7

Halakha and with an adherence to that Halakha.
lenient position is

accused of

strict Halakhic rule.
unsubstantiated.

representing

We will show that

a divergence from

these claims are

That the stringent position correlates

with a systematic bias

in interpreting

discover the source of that bias
2)

ethical

in 1)

rather

and applying the

Halakhic rulings on abortion and the fetus.

interpretation,

Any more

We will

attempt to

the methodology of

and theological

assumptions which do

not necessarily represent the only Jewish viewpoint and 3)
institutional

forces that condition contemporary Rabbinic

decision making.
It

is our view that the more lenient positions within the

current discussion have a wealth of classical Halakhic material
on which to base their view and that
consistent with the “authentic"
B.

their position is

tradition.

Evidence and Arguments - A Critique of

the Stringent

Position
We will

show that the correlation claim in untenable by

using several

lines of evidence.

Simultaneously we will

attempt to understand the source of the bias by examining the
stringent camp’s method of

interpretation and

its underlying

assumptions.
1.

The Early Halakhic Sources

In Chapter II we briefly review the early Halakhic sources
on abortion and demonstrate that there is
diverse set of
position.

ideas

a wide ranging and

rather than a single authoritative

We discuss evidence that an early rift of opinion

8

existed in the Talmudic period.

We note that both Biblical

Talmudic sources tend to regard the fetus

and

as having

significantly less status than its mother or other persons.
Finally,

we find no clear Biblical or Talmudic prohibition of

abortion.
2.

Contemporary Interpretations

In Chapter

III we consider contemporary Jewish religious

writing on abortion.

We notice that we can divide the field of

opinion along two different
author’s view of

axis.

On one axis we consider the

abortion from very restrictive at one end to

very permissive on the other.

Along the other

an author's view of whether Halakha

axis we consider

is binding

and normative.

Again at one end we get very strictly adhering

authors on the

other end those who are not bound by Halakha.

What

instructive is that these axis do not
correlation claim would
orthogonal.
quadrants.

That

lead us to expect.

is they divide the field

into four
1)

The stringent

restrictive on abortion and claim this position

adherence to Halakha which restricts

permissive authors who hold a

abortion,

2)

lenient position on abortion

despite their view that Halakha

is

restrictive on abortion.

This group does not consider Halakha binding.
group that the stringent position contrasts
presents

as the

Rather they are

We actually find the following:

orthodox camp by virtue of

run parallel

is

This

is the

itself with and

as evidence of the correlation claim.

There are two other groups,

however,

whose existence is

inconsistent with the correlation hypothesis.

3)

Authors with

9

a permissive stance on abortion who consider Halakha binding
and base their

lenient views on their

reading of Halakha.

4)

These authors are very stringent and disallow abortion except
to save the mother's
their

life.

They hold this position despite

interpretation of Halakha as essentially permitting

abortion.

They reject the permissive Halakha

in favor of

a

strong personal moral objection to abortion.
Groups

(3)

and

were strictly true.
against the claim,

(4)

are unexpected if

Though this
it does

abortion.

It

is not decisive evidence

indicate that

can disagree as to the sense of

reasonable scholars

the Halakhic

also demonstrates that

opinion the interpretation of

the correlation claim

ruling on

these differences of

the Halakha do not depend on an

author’s position on abortion.
3.

The Stringent Position and Legal Absolutism

In Chapter

IV we examine the stringent orthodox

understanding of

its own interpretive method.

understand how this position arrived

at

We wish to

its conclusions

about

abortion and Halakha given the multiplicity of possible
interpretations of this material.

As a

first

step,

understand how the stringent camp views Halakha

and

we need to
its own

exegetical methods.
We will
Halakha

find that the stringent orthodox position views

as monolithic,

unchanging.

absolute,

consistent,

divine and

These authors see their own method

for

interpreting the Halakha as a purely legalistic and technical
function.

They claim that philosophical or theological

10

speculation are not used or

relevant to the

adjudication of Halakhic rulings.

Indeed,

legislative
a superficial

reading of some of the contemporary Halakhic discussions seems
to corroborate this.

Proof text citation and

reliance on

authority seem at times to dominate the discussion and
ethical

argumentation.

mistaken.

We hope to show that this

To uncover the deeper philosophical

motivates the proof

replace

impression is

structure that

text arguments.

Having placed the stringent orthodox position in the
context of

its views on Halakha

and Halakhic exegesis,

larger

we can

now begin to formulate an organized critique.
4.

Cordozo and his Legal Framework

In Chapter V we will present
understanding
This

and critique of

the stringent orthodox position.

approach is based on taking

stringent positions claim that
subject

this position to a

a new approach toward an

a serious

its method

look at
is

legal method.

In the process of deciding

at hand.
is

from

a

legal

as

a simple

issue,

one

and extract their operative

only then can one apply this principle to the case
Cordozo argues that

inevitably introduced.

precedents

We

judicial process.

there is no such thing

must select precedent cases
principle,

legalistic.

legal critique borrowed

Benjamin Cordozo's theory of the nature of
According to Cordozo,

the

is

in each step of

this task,

bias

Choosing which cases to consider as

largely a subjective act

and will be influenced

by one's underlying philosophical biases.
principle from a given precedent

Extracting the

inevitably involves

11

abstracting and generalizing from the particular to the
universal.

Cordozo points out that

equally logical ways

and a justice

this can take place in many
[read Halakhist]

among them on the basis of some extra
preferences.

For

extra

the task is

in applying the principle,

"only half

there are many factors

that might determine the mode and direction of

its

progression.

as

historical,

Cordozo classifies these factors
traditional

and sociological.

choices need to be made and a

for society.

Cordozo’s analysis

Thus,
is

logical,

In each case,

justice will make these choices

on the basis of his underlying belief
goals

logical

Even when the principle has been cleanly

abstracted from the case material,
done."

legal,

must choose

system and his hopes

every justice becomes

a

legislator.

a tour de force which demonstrates

more naive theories about

and

that

the judicial process do not hold up

under scrutiny.
We will borrow Cordozo's

framework because

fits the stringent orthodox camp so well
a more complex
5.

interpretive method

is

its critique

and demonstrates that

really in operation.

A Critique of the Stringent Position

In Chapter VI,

we apply the framework we have borrowed from

Cordozo to critique the stringent position.
considering the most
abortion.

We begin by

important Halakhic precedents

In every case,

demonstrates a consistent

we will

relating to

show the stringent position

and systematic bias

in its selection,

interpretation and application of precedent materials.
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The evidence accumulates that the stringent position is not
simply correlated with a strict but straight-forward
interpretation of the Halakhic precedents,

but

rather with a

very selective and biased interpretation.

This throws the

correlation claim into serious doubt.
Once we have established that there is a systematic bias
operating within the stringent position, we will attempt to
discover its source.
1)

We will find possible sources

in:

philosophical theological assumptions and preconceptions

that are extra-Halakhic and do not necessarily represent
authentic Jewish viewpoints;
these authors would

2)

goals and aspirations that

like to promote but which are not

necessarily Halakhic.
Conclusion
In Chapter VII, we return to the question of what
contribution the Halakhic discussion of abortion can make to
the contemporary abortion debate.

We review the results of the

paper with this question as a focus.
contributions are considered.

Several

important

Chapter II
Halakhic Sources

Section 1.

Overview of Halakhic Sources^"

The supreme authority is the Torah.
this means the Pentateuch
broader sense,
religious

In its narrower sense,

(five books of Moses).

In its

it encompasses all of the developed Jewish

law.

There is a conventional division between the written law
(originally this
oral

law.

included only the five books of Moses)

The oral

two essential

interpretation is

forms:

a)

the Halakha

and the

in turn divisible into
is the law,

the detailed

and systematic application of the written and oral tradition to
particular cases;
of moral maxims,

b)

the "aggadah"

legends,

(narrative)

is a compilation

philosophical speculation.

We will

be less concerned with aggadah in this paper.
Around the year 200 A.D.,

the oral

down and became known as the Mishnah
time went by,

("The Study").

too,

was written

(The Manual of Study).

the Mishnah was the object of

commentary and exposition.
Talmud

law,

long and intense

This constitutes the Gemarah or

An additional source of biblical

interpretation was the Midrash

(exposition),

a

large extra

Talmudic collection.
The Talmudic Period comprises a span of

at

least six

centuries and was followed by post-talmudic codes.
distinguished was written by Rashi
1040-1105).

Around this time,

(Rabbi

The most

Shlomo Yitzhaki,

in addition,

emerged the

As
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"Tosafor"

(supplement),

commentaries that are usually

controversial proposing new solutions to previously studied
problems.
Maimonides

(Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon,

famous Jew of the Middle Ages,

1135-1204),

the most

produced the "Mishnah Torah”

(second torah),

a monumental code of Jewish law comprising all

the Jewish laws

in fourteen volumes totaling

1,000 chapters.

After the expulsion of the Jews from Spain,

Rabbi Joseph

Karo had the genius necessary to reduce the existing codices to
one code.

It took him twenty years of work and twelve years of

revision.

He called it the Shulkon Arukh

(The Set Table).

Later authorities and present day rabbis have concentrated
their efforts and thoughts
"Responsa."

in another body of

These are formal

replies to

literature,

legal questions

addressed to the scholars throughout generations.
codifiers were also authors of

responsa.

the

Many of the

A large proportion of

the source material on abortion is based on the responsa
literature.

The attractiveness of this

literature lies

in the

fact that each responsum is actually an essay rich in ethical
propositions and therefore a vital

Section 2.
A.

The Old Testament

facet of Jewish tradition.

and Its Rabbinical

Interpretation

Abortion as Tort
The Bible speaks directly of abortion in only one instance

and here it

is an accidental abortion:

When men fight and one of
and a miscarriage results
ensues, the penalty shall
woman's husband may exact

them pushes a pregnant woman
but no other misfortune
be fined according as the
from him.
But if other

15

misfortune ensues the penalty shall be life for life,
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot.
[Exodus 21:22-24]
As Feldman

explains,

this passage was interpreted and

codified to exclude feticide from capital crime.
viewed as property in this instance,

is

and feticide is not

considered murder but rather a tort.
distinguished from the case of

The fetus

This

is clearly

"other misfortune,"

of the mother, where penalty shall be "life for

i.e.

death

life."

On closer examination we can see that this Biblical passage
distinguishes three categories of
monetary compensation for

loss of property,

equal severity for bodily wounds,
homicide.

retribution.

Within this scheme,

A simple

a mutilation of

and capital punishment for

the Bible places feticide

squarely in the category of property damage.

In fact,

it

assigns ownership of the fetus to the father and specifies that
he is to be compensated for his
need be cautious

loss monetarily.

Perhaps we

in drawing too broad a principle since this

an accidental feticide.

Nevertheless,

is the only clear and direct Biblical

it

is

is telling that this

reference to an induced

abortion and the Bible treats it as a tort.
B.

"Nefesh Adam." The Breath of Life
Interestingly,

the Talmud in Niddah 44b

another passage as a source of

3

interprets

law on abortion.

The passage

reads simply "He that killeth any nefesh adam [human person]
shall surely be put to death."

[Gen.

9:6]

The Talmud explains

that the word "any"

is intended to include an infant, while the

words "nefesh adam"

[human person]

fetus.

specifically exclude a

For the fetus is not "nefesh adam"

and its destruction

V
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is therefore not a capital crime.
at first seems forced,

it is,

Although this interpretation

in fact,

understandable if we

consider the context of the passage:
And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord he shall
surely be put to death and all the congregation shall
certainly stone him.
The stranger as well as he that
is born in the land.
When he blasphemeth the name of
the Lord shall be put to death.
And he that killeth
any nefesh adam shall surely be put to death.
And he
that killeth a beast shall make it good; beast for
beast.
And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor
as he has done so shall it be done to him.
Breath for
breath, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.
As he caused a
blemish in a man so shall it be done to him again.
And he that killeth a beast shall restore it and that
killeth a nefesh adam he shall be put to death.
Ye
shall have one manner of law as well for the stranger
as for the native for I am the Lord your God.
[Leviticus 24:16-23]
We find here the same three categories:
mutilation, murder,

property damage,

as we had in the Exodus text.

similarity of structure in the two passages.

Perhaps the

Talmud understands each in relation to the other.
system,

Notice the

Within this

the Talmud is placing feticide along with the killing

of a beast as a crime recompensed only monetarily.
Another important reason that the Talmud chooses to make
this interpretation and exclude feticide from capital crime may
have to do with the meanings of the words "nefesh adam."
have indicated,
human person.

As we

most Jewish scholars translate this simply as

4

In his dissertation on the use of words in the abortion
debate,

Stephen Dixon notes that

associated with "breath"

and "life."'*

concerning the creation of man.
"breath of

life"

"nefesh"

is specifically

He cites the passages

The metaphor is of God's

turning dust into "nefesh."

[Gen.

2:7]

The
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implication of this particular life word is therefore
understood by Dixon to place full human personhood at the
moment of first breath.

This notion is remarkably consistent

with the Talmudic interpretation which places the moment of
full personhood also at first breath,
Nevertheless,

as we shall see later.

the implications of the specific word ,,nefeshM

as

referring to breathing are not expanded upon in the Jewish
sources.
C.

Rabbi Yeshmael - A Divergent Opinion
Another Biblical passage reads “He who sheds the blood of

man by; man shall his blood be shed."

[Gen 9:6]

This text

the first Biblical source for capital punishment,

is

and it

establishes the right of a human court to exact the ultimate
punishment.

In this case the Talmud,

R. Yeshmael's rather forced,
translation:

quotes

but grammatically possible,

“He who sheds the blood of man in man,

shall be shed."
man"

in Sanhedrin 57b,

R. Yeshmael goes on to explain that

his blood
"man in

refers to the fetus and that feticide i§. a capital crime.

Feldman^ comments that R. Yeshmael may have had an historic
reason for

"forcing"

the above interpretation,

condemn the Roman practice of his time.
opinion has entered the Halakha.

It

namely,

Nevertheless,

to
this

is difficult to understand

why the Talmud would interpret one passage as specifically
excluding feticide from capital crime and another as
specifically including feticide in that category.
this discrepancy as evidence that at

We will take

least two inconsistent

positions must have existed as far back as the Talmudic period
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regarding the Jewish law on feticide.
recall,

however,

It is important to

that R. Yeshmael's evidence is a forced

interpretation while the explicit Biblical

reference to

feticide considers it a tort.
D.

The Waters of Contention
Another Biblical passage is interesting because it has

been,

for the most part,

Jewish scholars.

left out of the abortion discussion by

It is mentioned,

however,

by the Biblical

scholar Jochle in a paper on the Mosaic Law and abortion.
Jochle quotes Numbers 5:11-31.

7

These passages deal with a

suspicious husband who accuses his wife of adultery.

The wife

is taken to the priest who shall prepare a special drink of
water,

earth from the tabernacle,

a scroll.

and the washed off

letters of

The passage continues:

He shall make the woman drink the water.
If she has
let herself become defiled and has been unfaithful to
her husband, then she will suffer a miscarriage or
untimely birth and her name be an example.
[Num.
5:25-31]
Jochle points out that the above passage indicates that
fetal

life was not regarded by the Bible as valuable if

conceived in adultery since its chemical abortion is secondary
to establishing the mother’s guilt or innocence.

It is rather

surprising that we do not find this argument made in any Judaic
discussion of abortion.

It is possible that the supernatural

nature of this trial by bitter waters removes it from the legal
Halakhic discussion.

Yet the question remains:

How can we

justify the death of even an illegitimate fetus if we believe
that the fetus has an independent value or if we believe that
there are duties which we owe any fetus?

This passage would
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seem to indicate that there are no such duties and that the
fetus'

life does not have an independent value.

What is the

justice of this miscarriage?
E.

The Seotuagint
There is an alternate version of the first Biblical passage

we mentioned concerning two men who are fighting.

The

Septuagint is a Greek translation of the Bible produced in
O

Alexandria.

Feldman

word "ason"

points out that

is rendered "form"

in that translation the

rather than "harm."

then reads "if there is no form he shall be fined
there be form [to the miscarried fetus]
life for life."

[Exodus 21:23]

The text
.

.

.

But

if

then shalt thou give

This mistranslation was thus

understood to mean that if the woman were in early stages of
pregnancy,

before there is

"form,"

pays monetary compensation.
once there is

"form,"

then the man who pushed her

However,

later in the pregnancy,

the man is responsible with his

the woman's miscarriage.

This introduced a very different

tradition into early church teachings.
accepting the Septuagint version,
murder.

Later,

life for

Thus Tertullian,

preached that feticide was

Church Fathers accepted the original Hebrew

text but continued in the belief that feticide was murder.
From its very beginnings,
different

Christianity takes away a

lesson from the Bible as to the status of the fetus

and the criminality of abortion.
mistranslation,
no accident,

In all

likelihood,

this

like R. Yeshmael's strained interpretation,

but a reaction to Roman practice.

was
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F.

Conclusion
Clearly there are many more sources in the Bible that deal

with family life,
However,

procreation,

and the pregnant state.

only the few passages mentioned here deal directly

with the fetus and have legally binding status in the Halakha.
We see that,

except for R. Yeshmael’s interpretation,

all

cited Biblical texts consider feticide in a separate category
from homicide,

and value the fetus not as an independent

individual,

but as property.

Section 3.

The Talmud and Early Authorities

The Talmud is the major source text for all of Halakha.

We

will restrict our discussion to those Talmudic sources
concerning abortion which have served as the basis for

later

codifiers,

actively

and whose meaning and significance is still

discussed.
A.

The Mishna Concerning a Difficult Labor
The most explicit Talmudic ruling on therapeutic abortion

is the following:
If a woman is having difficulty giving birth, one cuts
up the fetus within her and takes it out limb by limb,
because her life takes precedence over its life.
Once
its greater part has emerged you do not touch it
because you may not set aside one life for another
[Uholut 7:6]
This Mishna has become the cornerstone of all

later

Halakhic discussion and disputation on abortion as we shall
see.

We must examine the above passage against the background

of fundamental Halakhic principles of capital

law.
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First is the notion of "pekua nefesh"
All religious
to life.

- danger to life.

law can and must be suspended in cases of danger

There are three exceptions/ murder,

idolatry for which one must martyr oneself
transgress.

Yet,

for any other

incest and

rather than

law one must transgress

it to

preserve life.
Second is a principle explicated by the Talmud in Sanhedrin
54b that

"one may not put one life over another for you do not

know that one's blood is redder than his fellows."

It is to

this principle that the Mishna refers once the fetus has
emerged.

It then prohibits the taking of the newborn infant's

life to save its mother.

The general principle of not ordering

one life as more important than another thus begins to apply to
the infant at the moment of

its birth and no sooner.

Since the ruling in this case is that we do not
infanticide,

but do allow feticide to save the mother's

this must imply a

lesser status for the fetus.

explanation of Rashi
"For as

allow

Such is the

(a 12th century gloss on the Talmud).

long as it has not yet emerged into the world it

a nefesh

[living person]

mother."

[Rashi on Sanhedrin 72b]

word "nefesh,"
personhood.

life,

and one may kill

it to save the

Note again the use of the

implying that "breath"

As we shall see later,

is not

is required for full

the more lenient schools of

thought have interpreted this text broadly as teaching that the
fetus is not a "person"
encouraged,

and thus that abortion while not

is permitted for a wide variety of

reasons.

The more stringent school emphasizes the life-endangering
nature of this case and interprets it very narrowly to mean
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that abortion is absolutely prohibited,
status of murder.

but not at the capital

Even though it is absolutely prohibited, we

allow it as we would allow suspension of other

laws when life

, ,
10
is at stake.
B.

The Ruling of Maimonides - The Fetus as Aggressor
The understanding of this Mishna is further complicated by

the code of Maimonides, who states:
This too is a command not to take pity on the life of
an aggressor.
Therefore the sages have ruled that
when a woman has difficulty in giving birth one may
cut up the child within her womb because he is like a
pursuer seeking to kill her.
Once his head has
emerged he may not be touched for we do not set aside
one life for another; this is the natural course of
the world.11
Maimonides seems to add the notion that we are allowed to
kill the fetus because it has the status of
Halakha permits,

in fact

insists,

an aggressor.

that one must kill

The

any

aggressor who is pursuing another with the intent to kill.
Many have drawn the implication that

it

is only when the fetus

can be classified as an aggressor that we may kill
its mother.

That

is,

danger to the mother,
this results

if the fetus

is not the direct cause of

then we cannot

abort the fetus even if

in both fetus and mother dying.

Others have

argued that in order to be considered an aggressor,
must be recognized as a full person.
out,

it to save

As Feldman

the fetus
points

this controversial codification of the law by Maimonides

has led to literally dozens of different explanations.
shall

return to this point.

We
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C.

The Condemned Woman
The Talmud discusses the fetus and abortion in another

situation:

a pregnant woman who is sentenced to execution.

This passage is

rather dramatic,

even bizarre,

understood as an analysis of the principles
than a reflection of practice.
carried out

and must be

involved,

rather

Capital punishment was

in the Talmudic Period.

rarely

The Passage is as

follows:

Mishnah:
If a woman is about to be executed one does
not wait for her until she gives birth; but if she has
already sat on the birth stool one waits for her until
she gives birth . . .
Gemara:
But that is self evident for it is her body!
It is necessary to teach it for one might have assumed
since Scripture says "according as the woman's husband
shall lay upon him" that it [the woman's child] is the
husband's property, of which he should not be
deprived.
Therefore we are informed [that it is not
so] . . .
"But if she had already sat on the birthstool":
what is the reason?
As soon as it moves from its
place in the womb it is another body.
Rav Juda said
in the name of Samuel:
If a woman is about to be
executed one strikes her against her womb so that the
child may die first to avoid her being disgraced.
[Arakhin 7a-b]
Rochel Biale

13

points out that this text

seems extremely

cruel but actually involves a great deal of compassion toward
women.

To understand this, we will briefly explain the major

points of this text.

The rule underlying the Mishna

one does not delay between sentencing and execution.

is that
It

is

considered a form of psychological torment for the accused to
wait in fear

for the execution of

sentence is passed,

a sentence.

once

the court must execute within 24 hours.

The Mishna here extends this general

rule to apply to a

pregnant woman and concludes that her pain,
of

Therefore,

living under the sentence of execution,

that

is the anguish

outweighs any
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consideration we have for the life of the fetus.

Neither

consideration for the fetus itself nor her husband's rights can
force a woman to endure the anguish of sentence for the
duration of her pregnancy.

Seen as an analysis of principles,

this ruling gives the mother's interests a clear priority over
those of the fetus or her husband's interests.
The Mishna then makes an exception once labor has begun
because the fetus is then a "separate body"
full person.

Thus,

though not yet a

a distinction is made between the fetus

prior to the onset of

labor where it is considered part of

mother and subordinate to her interest,
labor but before birth.

During

labor,

its

and after the onset of
the fetus is a separate

entity whose independence we recognize but not yet on equal
status with its mother.
The Gemora then goes on to indicate that

in fact we kill

the fetus just prior to executing the mother to avoid
disgrace.

Rashi here explains that were the mother to miscarry

prior to or during her execution,

this would disgrace her.

This rather gruesome detail needs also to be understood as
discussion of theoretical

legal principles.

What is

established is the rule that abortion is permitted to prevent
the mother great distress even if
circumstance.

it is not a

life-saving

The fetus is sacrificed to prevent the mother's

anguish or shame.
A few Halakhists have followed up on the logic of this
ruling.

For them it has become the cornerstone of a more

lenient position on abortion.

Moreover,

we can notice that

this Mishnah establishes a three-way distinction:

the fetus
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before labor,

during labor,

and the infant after birth.

special status is accorded to the fetus during
full personhood but,

as we have said,

labor.

a sort of

onset of

labor.

of labor,

Perhaps,

the argument goes,

reasons

labor, we note

life is permitted even after
before the onset

before the fetus acquires a partial

would allow abortion for

Not yet

individuality.

If we go back now to the ruling on the difficult
that abortion to save the mother's

A

individuality, we

less serious than an imperiled

lif e.
The more stringent school of thought

14

has chosen not to

draw these conclusions but rather to view the status of the
fetus in the case of a condemned woman as a special and
exceptional case.

According to this view,

condemned with the guilty mother and thus,
forfeited.

the fetus
its

is

life has been

We cannot establish a Talmudic view of the ordinary

fetus from this situation.
self-defeating,

This

interpretation,

for even by its own reasoning,

however,

is

the status of

the mother completely dominates any duty we have independently
toward the fetus.

If her condemnation applies to the fetus,

then certainly the fetus cannot be said to have any status or
"right to life."

It,

therefore,

does not seem that one can

avoid the almost radical implications of this Mishna.
There are other Talmudic references to the fetus and its
legal status.

However,

since they do not deal directly with

abortion they have had a different sort of

impact on

contemporary Halakhic discussion.

return to these

passages in a

later chapter.

We will
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Section 4.

The Later Authorities and the Responsa Literature

The Biblical,

Talmudic and Early Rabbinic literature forms

the binding code of Halakha to which later authorities must
adhere.

As we have seen,

this early literature makes

surprisingly few references to abortion.

Moreover,

many of

these references are ambiguous or may be interpreted to apply
to special and odd circumstances.

In contrast,

from later authorities and the Responsa

the literature

literature are vast.

Because of the paucity of early authoritative ruling and also
because the circumstances under which abortion was considered
changed,

this later

literature reflects a vast spectrum of

opinion in its understanding of the status of the fetus and the
conditions under which abortion is allowed.

Each of these

scholars have attempted to base his ruling on understanding of
the earlier literature which they accepted as Halakhicly
binding.
A.

The Two Branches
Feldman
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has proposed some useful generalizations to

help organize this vast array of differing opinion.
authorities are bound by the Mishna in Oholot
woman endangered during

labor)

First,

all

(concerning a

to agree that:

not a person of equal standing with its mother,

1)
2)

the fetus is
feticide is

not murder in the usual sense and that one may perform an
abortion if the fetus is the proximate cause of danger to the
mother’s

life.

From these commonly-held views,
into two branches in the Responsa

Feldman sees a bifurcation

literature.

One branch

interprets the Mishna in the narrowest sense and sees abortion

27

as "akin to murder."

As Feldman says,

"It then builds down

from this strict position to embrace a broader interpretation
of what constitutes life-saving situation."1^

The other

branch "assumes no real prohibition against abortion

.

.

.

except perhaps during the most advanced stages of pregnancy and
builds up from this position to safeguard against
indiscriminate abortion."

17

...
This branch views the Mishna in

the broadest sense as telling us that even after

labor has

begun,

It is

the mother's best

interest predominates.

important to note that many of these later opinions,
the Responsa
material.
B.

especially

literature, were written for actual case

We shall cite a few examples from each of these.

The Restrictive Approach
This branch can be traced to Issac Lappronte

(17th century)

who ruled that abortion is permitted only when the mother's
actual
R.

life was directly threatened by the fetus.

Grodzinski

(19th century)
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extends this ruling in a case of a

pregnant woman with a life-threatening heart condition.
the ruling was that since the mother's

Here

life was endangered,

abortion was permitted even though the fetus was not the
.
ig
proximal cause of this danger.
R.

Grossnass

(20th century)

ruled against allowing an

abortion in a severely retarded girl who had gotten pregnant,
despite the danger that this pregnancy represented to the
girl's well-being and ability to care for herself.
the ruling turned on the fact that the girl's
endangered.
the actual

Here again,

life was not

He argued that the fetus is a potential

life,

only

life of the mother has greater value and only this
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will justify an abortion.

Lesser

"values"

like the mother's

health or well-being do not suffice to override the value of a
"potential
R.

life."2^

Hayyim Solovetchic

(20th century)

fetus must be an aggressor,
danger to maternal
R.

Feinstein

i.e.

the actual proximal cause of

life in order to allow an abortion.

(20th century)

fetal indications.

has ruled that the
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has forbidden abortion for any

He likens abortion to murder and thus

cannot permit it even when the fetus is hopelessly deformed.
Just as one may not take the life of an adult despite any
handicap or poor chance for survival.
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. .

Similarly,

R.

J.

H.

Zwieg has condemned abortion in the case of a thalidomide fetus
with documented deformity.
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One can readily understand the

reasons of this strict branch in disallowing abortion for fetal
indications.

It is only when the value of the fetal potential

is outweighed by another actual
according to this view.

life that abortion is permitted

No such weighing of values is involved

in cases of fetal abnormality.

Even if the abnormality

suffered by the fetus somehow lessened its value as potential
life, which this view would not grant,

there is nothing to

outweigh this value except maternal distress,

but then we are

back to maternal indications for abortion and this branch
recognizes only danger to health as sufficient reason to allow
abortion.
C.

The Lenient Approach
We turn now to the approach that assumes no real

prohibition against abortion but may "build up"
position.

The earliest such authority is R.

from this

Trani

(16th
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century) who ruled that abortion was not homicide and was
permitted for a mother’s health or her cure even if

life itself

were not endangered.24

in a case

R.

Bachrach

(17th century),

involving an adultress who wished to abort her illegitimate
fetus,

ruled that there is no prohibition against abortion of

either a legitimate or illegitimate fetus.

However,

he states

that we disallow abortions to discourage promiscuity.
position is very controversial,

however.

25

Another

This

17th

century ruling by R. Mizrachi permitted an abortion in a case
involving the fear that continued pregnancy would bring on an
hysterical attack in the mother.
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This is an important

precedent for introducing considerations of maternal
psychological,
R.

as well as physical,

Emden (18th century)

health into the discussion.

rejects the position of Bachrach

and insists that an illegitimate fetus does have a
status,

since,

in theory,

adultery is a capital offense.

though we may not carry out this sentence,
fetus has

less claim to its potential

importantly,

R.

ruled,

Even

the illegitimate

life.

More

Emden ruled that even the legitimate fetus may

be aborted to save the mother "great pain.”
century)

lesser

in the case of rape,

Orgadol

(19th

that a woman need not

"nurture seed implanted within her against her will."24
Ben Zion Uziel

(20th century)

rules that abortion on demand

is prohibited but that even a "slim”
it allowable.

He bases his ruling

reason may suffice to make

largely on the case of the

condemned woman which we have discussed.
Moshe Zwieg

(20th century)

cites a
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law from Maimonides

regarding a pregnant woman craving for food.

Her husband may
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not stop her from overeating or eating strange foods by arguing
that this will cause a miscarriage.

The rule given is that

"her pain is to be considered first."

R.

Zwieg,

noting that

"her pain" takes precedence over the life of the fetus,

finds

that there may be sufficient reasons involving maternal
avoidance of pain that would justify abortion.
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This principle that one may permit an abortion to save the
mother great pain is taken up by R. Weinberg

(20th century) who

rules in a case involving German measles that abortion is
permitted because of the distress and pain that the mother
would suffer with a deformed child.
in the more restrictive approach,
justify abortion.

However,
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Notice that here,

as

a fetal indication cannot

if one views that fetal

indication

in terms of its affect on the mother then this branch of
thought will permit an abortion to save the mother pain and
anguish.

The principle is preserved:

fetus because of a deformity.

there can be no "lesser"

For both branches of thought,

all fetuses are created with equal value.

Some may cause

distress by their deformity and this distress may outweigh its
value.

Similarly R. Waldenberg

(20th century)

has ruled that a

Tay-Sachs child may be aborted to save pain and psychological
suffering of its parents.

We cannot abort the fetus with

the argument that we are saving it pain,

since this would be

tantamount to euthanasia which is not permitted.

It is

important to stress that according to this view there are no
possible fetal

indications for abortion.

Quality of the future

child’s life is never a consideration when balanced against no
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life.

Only maternal indications,

psychological or others,

be they medical,

can be balanced against the life of

the fetus.

Section 5.

Conclusion

In this part we have given a very brief overview of the
classical Halakhic literature pertaining to abortion.
seen that undisputably abortion is permitted,
when the fetus
much,

in fact required

is directly threatening the mother’s

at least,

We have

life.

This

is unanimously accepted and even this much is

in significant contrast with certain Catholic opinions.
Beyond this narrow consensus there are disagreements in the
classical

literature as to the status of the fetus and as to

what circumstances and needs outweigh that status and permit an
abortion.

We have tried to indicate that even within the

traditional Halakhic literature a division of opinion has
existed from the earliest of times.
One of our original questions was:
on abortion?

what is the Jewish view

Even restricting ourselves to traditional

Halakhic sources we have no complete and definitive answer.
The literature rather spans a broad spectrum of opinion,
it claiming to be within the realm of Halakha.
other words,

all of

There are,

in

varying precedents that one may draw upon in

formulating an authentic Jewish view of abortion.
In the next part, we will discuss the contemporary Jewish
writing on abortion.

As we shall see,

more fragmented and polarized.

the opinion becomes even

For up to this point we have

only been dealing with authors who consider Halakha as binding
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divine law though they may disagree as to the nature and
content of that law.

In dealing with contemporary authors, we

will continue to focus on those who view the Halakha as
important but must also mention those for whom Halakha
represents only a source of moral ideas and historical Jewish
laws but who do not feel themselves bound by either the ethics
or law of traditional Halakha.

The contemporary reform

movement in Judaism is one example of this view.

The question

must focus on how we interpret and apply the traditional
literature.

What method of hermeneutics or

legal thinking,

or

textual criticism are used in approaching the traditional
literature?

Are there competing

interpretations?

interpretative system claim to be "authentic"?

Can any

In moving to

the contemporary debate these are the questions we must keep in
the back of our minds.
We must abandon the question as to what is the Jewish view
of abortion and ask:

Given the rich and complex body of

Halakhic thinking on abortion,
this tapestry,

as it were,

how have Rabbinical authors used

to help resolve or at

understand the ethical and religious issues
abortion?

least

involved in

Chapter III
Abortion and Contemporary Halakhic Exegesis

Section 1.

Overview of Contemporary Positions

In considering the contemporary Jewish views on the
abortion issue, we are mostly concerned with examining how
Halakha is used in formulating those views.

To this end we can

consider two axis or polarities dividing the field into four
quadrants.
Halakha,

On one axis, we can consider an author's view of

its nature,

evolution and the degree to which it is

normative and binding on his ethical-moral beliefs and
practice.

Along this axis there is broad spectrum of opinion.

On one end, we find an absolutist notion in which Halakha is
divine,

unchanging and absolutely binding in all

particulars.

Towards the middle of this

its

line, we find authors

like Robert Gordis1 who view Halakha as a more fluid and
dynamic body of
insights.
Washofsky

law which can change with new ethical

On the far end, we find authors
3

like Brickner

or

who look to Halakha as an historically interesting

source of Jewish values but who do not consider it either
divinely ordained or morally binding.
On the other axis, we consider an author's view of
abortion.

At one end, we find authors who would only permit an

abortion to save the mother's

life.

On the other end, we find

authors who permit abortion for any reason whatever.
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The important point for our discussion is that rather than
running parallel and establishing a correlation,
perpendicular,

i.e.

perpendicular axis,

these axis are

unrelated at an important level.

Like any

they divide the field into four quadrants.

Indeed, we find opinions that fit each of these four
quadrants.

There is the stringent orthodox who are restrictive

on abortion and strict on the authority of Halakha in their
lives.

But there are also authors who consider Halakha

absolutely binding but are lenient on abortion because of their
. .
4
belief that this is the correct Halakhic opinion.

There are

also authors for whom Halakha is not binding but who believe
that the Halakha is in agreement with their own moral
in allowing abortion.

intuition

Another group of authors who do not take

Halakha to be binding also interpret this Halakha to be liberal
on abortion and therefore reject the Halakhic opinion because
their own ethical beliefs are strictly anti-abortion!

5

We will examine these four quadrants in the following
sections.

Section 2.

The Stringent Orthodox Position

This is the position we have discussed in the
Introduction.

The view that it has articulated is that Jewish

Halakha is anti-abortion except under the circumstance in which
the mother's

life is in serious danger.

non-life-threatening reasons,
economic,

social,

Thus,

abortion for

such as psychological well-being,

and family planning is not permitted.

This stringent camp,

as we have said,

has claimed a specia 1

observer status for its position vis-a-vis the Halakha;
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claiming that its views correlate with the strictness of its
adherence to Halakha;

and that a more lenient view of abortion

correlates with a deviation or falling away from authentic
Jewish tradition.

These authors also claim that their own view

is arrived at in a simple reportorial sense.

That they are

acting as neutral judges simply comparing Halakhic cases in a
simple legalistic fashion.

They deny introducing any

philosphical or ethical bias into this process and accuse the
more lenient camp of
bias.

This position,

introducing such philosphical and ethical
as Green states:

has been forcefully articulated by some of the leading
English language writers and commentators in Jewish
Biomedical ethics [and is] . . . the position one is
most likely to encounter in contemporary texts or
articles dealing with questions of Jewish Bioethics.6
The result is a body of writing . . . which represents
only one side, one voice, in a complex tradition but
which often presents itself as the normative Jewish
view.^
8

Adler,

Cormi,'1'0 Halibord,Jakobovitz ,

Klein,'1"3 Rosner,^

Steinberg,15 Tendler,16 and Fiensten

Section 3.

Bleich,

9

We refer here to writers such as:

17

The Lenient Halakhist

The stringent orthodox position has been criticized by a
growing number of commentators who are also working within the
Halakhic framework.

Thus,

a more lenient camp is beginning to

emerge and offer alternative views of the choices available
within the Halakhic tradition.

These authors point both to

legal Halakhic precedent, which is plentiful as we have seen,
and to broader philosphical theological aspects of Judaism in
support of this position.
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Ronald Green has argued that the stringent orthodox camp is
"displaying a markedly conservative tendency that is out of
keeping with much of the spirit of earlier traditions as well
as many of the explicit rulings of the tradition."

18

Green

goes on to argue that the stringent orthodox position has

lost

sight of the humanistic intentiona1ity of many of the
fundamental teachings of Judaism.

19

Similarly Blu Greenberg notes that
There are no real precedents for what we now call
abortion on demand.
One obvious way to maintain some
integrity within the Halakhic framework would be to
broaden the interpretation of therapeutic abortion.
To extend the principle of precedence of the mother's
actual life and health to include serious regard for
the quality of life as well.
And there exists in
Halakha some precious precedents where exactly that
has been done.2®
According to these authors and others similarly minded,
Halakha must be maintained as the focus for discussion."
Yet within that structure,

one finds

"the
21

lenient attitudes towards

elevating the needs of the mother or the couple so that these
needs can outweigh the value of the fetus under certain
circumstances.
Another example is given by the chief of the religious
court in Jerusalem who recently permitted the abortion of
Tay-Sachs fetus because the mental and spiritual needs of the
mother justified an abortion.

Section 4.

22

The Non-Halakhic Permissive Position

As we have stressed already,

by non-Halakhist we do not

mean positions that discard the Halakha but rather positions
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that do not regard it as absolute binding normative law.
Reform Judaism,

for example, will not accept the authority of

Halakha but will

look to the Halakhic tradition as a source for

classical Jewish ideas.

Conservative Judaism takes an

intermediate position regarding Halakha as an historical

and

dynamic process that is divine in inspiration but evolves with
time and changes.
literature is

We limit ourselves to a few examples,

as the

itself vast.

Balfour Brickner,

a well-known Reform Rabbi

and schol ar,

has stated that his position on abortion rests on both hi s
liberal progressive politics and his reading of Halakha:
Jewish law does not consider a fetus a person.
Jewis h
law agrees with the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court . . . The unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense . . .
Judaism permits abortion,
clearly . . . .23
For Brickner,
"nefesh"

[person]

let us state that

the text of Rashi that a fetus is not a
is central.

variety of circumstances as

Therefore,

one may conside r a

legitimizing the need for abo rtion.

Psychological needs of a woman as, for example, women
with large families who simply cannot face another
pregnancy . . . Abortion is a technique which should
be freely available to women seeking physical and
mental health . . . Judaism looks on abortion with
distaste, but it clearly permits it and permission is
what is at issue in the current debate raging in
America.24
Thus Brickner is not bound by the Halakhic law and within
his theological scheme he could justify abortion despite the
Halakha.

Yet Brickner does not take such a stance because his

own reading of the Halakhic sources is that of permissive
Halakhic precedents.
stringent camp:

In fact,

Brickner is critical of the

4
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Despite the plethora of evidence from Judaism
recognizing the legality of abortion, [some] orthodox
Jewish authorities have taken and continue to take a
negative view toward abortion.
The reasons [for the
strict orthodox] prohibition on abortion despite the
Rabbinic literature permitting abortion are complex
and diverse ... It is precisely because of this
unique regard for the sanctity of human life [in the
Jewish tradition] that we see as most desirable the
right of any couple to be free to produce only that
number of children whom they could feed, clothe and
educate properly; only that number to whom they could
invest themselves as real parents as creative partners
with God ...
It is precisely this traditional
respect for the sanctity of human life that prompts us
to support legislation enabling women to be free from
the whims of biological roulette.
A similar view is expressed by Rabbi Mark Washofsky.

26

These same authors do not hesitate to reject classic Halakhic
views,

for example on capital punishment,

the strict observance

of the Sabbath or questions of dietary proscription.
the issue of abortion,

Yet on

it is because of Halakhic rulings

rather

than despite them that these authors have taken their
positions.

In our view,

this throws serious doubt on the

correlation claim.
The next group of

authors agree with Brickner and Washofsky

that Halakha is permissive with regard to abortion.
agree that Halakha is not binding.

They also

But taken together,

come up with the opposite conclusion:

they

if abortion is not

prohibited that is an Halakhic shortcoming.

It should have

been prohibited!

Section_5_._The Non-Halakhic Anti-Abortion Position
There are several authors who fall

into this camp,

their

position is that abortion should be severely restricted despite
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the permissiveness of the Halakha as they read and interpret
it.

Thus they find themselves anti-abortion,

Halakhic rule,

but

not because of

rather because they do not feel bound by a

too lenient Halakhic stance on this issue.

The mere existence

of such a position should put to rest once and for all the
correlation thesis.
Thus Richard Block criticizes the Reform Movement's use of
Talmudic texts to justify its claim "that the Talmud supports
the holding the Supreme Court

in Roe v. Wade that an unborn

child is not a person and therefore the pregnant woman’s right
to an abortion may not be unreasonably restricted."

27

Block asks.
Is it appropriate for Reform Jews who do not accept
the legal authority of Halakha to utilize its
precedents in advocating the right to abortion ....
. . . we would be foolish to take guidance from
Talmudic decisions and medieval commentators upon them
when the authorities base their rulings on the state
of science and medicine of the time.
Thus in my view
even if the Rabbis of the Talmudic period had in fact
believed as Rashi asserts that a child is not a nefesh
until it is born, we could hardly accept this
reasoning uncritically today ... We need hardly
defer to Talmudic rulings which may have been based on
ignorance of things the Rabbis had no way of knowing
in their own age, particularly when medical or
scientific issues are involved.28
In other words,

Block feels that contemporary scientific

evidence regarding the physiology of the fetus would argue for
considering the fetus an "identifiable human-to-be already in
the process of becoming."

Therefore we must respect its

individuality and cannot permit abortions except under the most
dire emergencies.

This position is in odd contradistinction to

the stringent orthodox position which holds that all Talmudic
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rulings are divinely inspired and no "new"
is relevant.

However,

scientific evidence

that stringent orthodox position

believes its anti-abortion stance is derived from,
contrasted with,

not

Talmudic opinion.

After conceding that

legal precedent in Halakha is

permissive with regard to abortion.

Block argues

Rather than wend a tortuous way through the time and
place bound specifics of various cases and rulings as
if we were lawyers practicing law before a court whose
jurisdiction we do not acknowledge, we ought to seek
out the fundamental moral thrust of Jewish tradition
and its enduring values . . . My guess is that the
rabbis simply did not envision a Jewish woman wanting
to abort an unborn child for any reason other than to
save her own life.
This appeal to Jewish values over and above Halakhic law is
also made by the more
Greenberg,

31

Green,

32

opposite conclusion.

liberal Halakhists such as Biale,

30

but with the intent of coming to the
Feldman,

at first part of this group.

ends up agreeing with Block.
After a soul-searching discussion,

Feldman concludes

So I have joined forces with those conservative voices
in the community who disallow abortion except for the
gravest reasons such as threat to life, though that's
not what the more liberal Jewish legal tradition
provides.
It's important to remember how my stand
developed.
Our mothers and grandmothers who came to
the rabbis and asked questions about abortion spoke
from an entirely different mental set.
They were
women who, if they had three children, knew that the
fourth child would go without shoes but it didn't
matter, money was not a factor ....
. . . The philosphic rather than the legal Jewish
tradition must be brought to bear, stressing reverence
for life and even potential life.33
Like Block,

Feldman rejects what he sees as a permissive Jewish

Halakha by arguing that social-ethical conditions that
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determined that law were different and no longer applicable.
We find Feldman claiming that the thrust of extra-legal and
personal view of Jewish life and ethics but not the Halakha
leads him toward an anti-abortion position.
David Novak also writes in opposition to abortion:
This analysis is within the scope of modern Halakhic
thinking which I would characterize as not only
examining the various precedents within the Halakhic
literature and also taking into consideration (1)
philosophical and theological perspectives, (2)
historical background ....
In other words, general moral standards universally
accepted take precedence over specific [Halakhic]
technicalities ....
In other words, law [Halakha] based on empirical
evidence admits of modification when newer empirical
evidence becomes available . . . Any inferences from
rabbinic sources that belittle the status of the fetal
life are highly suspect on the basis of the latest
scientific evidence.
This evidence assigns a much
higher biological status to the life of unborn child
than had heretofore been known.34
These last arguments are typical

in the literature of

non-Halakhists struggling to remain attached to some core set
of Jewish values but unable to agree with particular Halakhic
rulings.

And these arguments tend to run as follows

must be seen in the context in which it was written,

The law
i.e.

within a given social and ethical system which may no longer
exist.

Moreover,

scientific advances,

even ethical advances,

should be taken into consideration if these newer
not available.
social,

insights were

We should not be blind to changes in either

ethical or scientific thought.
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What is new about these arguments is not their form but the
fact that they view Halakha as too liberal on abortion.

They

call for an abandoning of this lenient Halakhic stand in favor
of a stricter,

more "scientific" view of abortion.

The fact that reasonable scholars can plead in the name of
scientific evidence and a general ethic for the abandonment of
a too permissive Halakhic stand on abortion should put to rest
the correlation claim once and for all.

The fact that these

authors are in complete agreement with the stringent position
with regard to abortion but view the Halakhic literature in the
complete opposite way establishes the multiplicity of meanings
and possible interpretations of the Halakha on this issue.

Section 6.

Conclusion

We have presented views from all

four quadrants defined by

the Halakhic authority polarity and the abortion polarities.
We find reasonable scholars disagreeing about the morality of
abortion,

about the normative authority of Halakha and about

just what the Halakha has to say in regard to abortion.

But we

do not find that these disagreements correlate in the way the
stringent camp claims they should if an anti-abortion stand is
derived simply from a strict adherence to Halakhic principles.
Several issues that have been touched on will
greater discussion.

require

What is the method of Halakhic exegesis or

interpretation that the stringent camp is claiming as
authentic?

Are there alternate methods of approaching the

Halakha in an "authentic"

fashion?

Given the diversity of
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Halakhic precedents,
position?

how does the stringent camp arrive at its

Is there an interpretive bias?

What

is its source?

Related to these issues is the question of the "spirit" or
"thrust" of Jewish thinking and ethics that is often referred
to.

Is it legitimate to introduce general theological and

philosophical principles into a Halakhic discussion?

Who

determines just what authentic Jewish ethics or philosophy is?
More precisely,

is it actually possible to discuss Halakhic

issues without willy-nilly introducing some interpretive
philosophy or theology?
We will

look at these questions

start with, we will

in subsequent chapters.

look at how the stringent camp views its

own method and ideas about Halakhic decisions in order to
better understand how this camp's position comes about.

To

Chapter IV
The Stringent Halakhist and Legal Absolutism

Section 1.

Introduction

In this chapter we will examine the stringent orthodox
understanding of its own interpretive method.
chapter, we will
For now,

however,

In a subsequent

introduce a framework to critique this view.
it is important to understand the view this

position takes on Halakha and on its own relation to that
Halakha.

This stringent orthodox position is perhaps the most

difficult for contemporary readers to understand,
of its method and

in terms of its conclusions.

this position we can,

therefore,

both in terms

By illuminating

clarify some basic and

important distinctions in the approach to textual exegesis and
interpretation.
In reading the literature,
that there is

one at first gets the impression

less of an ethical or moral discussion than proof

text citation and reliance on authority pronouncement.
fact,

it is part of the stringent orthodox claim that

In
its

approach to Halakha is

legalistic and technical,

philosophic or moral.

In a later section we will try to show

that this is not,

in fact,

the case.

reader to begin to think of the real

not

However, we invite the
issues that are the deep

structure behind and motivate the seemingly superficial proof
text arguments.
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Section 2.

Halakha as an Absolute

The stringent orthodox camp is committed in the first place
to both the absolute and unchanging nature of Halakha.
is a single,

divinely revealed law that,

There

among other things,

defines the status of the fetus and the limited circumstances
under which abortion is allowed.

The ontological status of the

fetus has been built in to the divine creation.

We are left

with the epistemological problem of discovering that status by
correctly interpreting the body of revealed law.
Thus Bleich states emphatically,
change."1

"Jewish law does not

Bleich goes on to explain his view that Halakha is

a synthetic a priori.

He quotes the Talmud and explains:

Even that which a conscientious student will one day
teach in the presence of his master was already
revealed to Moses at Sinai.
[Palestinian Talmud Peah
2:4]
All of Halakha is inherent in the original
revelation at Mt. Sinai.
Some positions of Halakha
were fully formulated; others remain latent, awaiting
investigation and analysis.
Often it is the need of
one hour, a specific query or problem which serves as
the impetus to discover what has been inherent in the
Halakha from the moment of its inception.
The result
is not a change or a new construct.
It is a priori in
the sense that it was always present in Torah, it is
synthetic only in the sense that it requires a
stimulus to prompt the investigation which serves to
reveal that which had already been available.2
Despite what is probably an incorrect use of the term
"synthetic a priori" when referring to revealed truths,
Bleich's intention is clear.
code,

the Bible,

He believes that the written

together with its complete exegesis,

law, was all divinely revealed at one historic period.
Halakha begins as a complete and perfect set of

the oral
Thus

laws which is

also completely known and understood by Biblical era priests.
What follows is a sort of epistemological entropy.

The written
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law is preserved but the oral

law is imperfectly passed down.

Mistakes and then disagreements set in as more is forgotten and
confused.

Thus,

by the time of the Talmudic redaction which is

an attempt to preserve the heretofore oral

law in writing,

there are many disagreements and confusions.
however,

The Talmud,

has rules for resolving many of these conflicts in

favor of one party or the other.
to rediscover the original,
mixture of truth and "noise"

divinely intended law from the
that has come down to him as the

classical Halakhic literature.
which the law might
misunderstood.

Thus the Halakhist's job is

Notice that the only sense in

legitimately change is to be forgotten or

Also notice the monolithic nature of Halakha.

In this view there should ideally be no disagreements and all
of Halakha is self-consistent and,

Section 3.

in fact,

complete.

Halakha as a Legalistic System

Closely related to the previous point is the legalistic
nature of Halakhic interpretation.

This view maintains that

the best way to preserve and maintain the original Halakha
to stick very close to precedent

laws and rulings.

important bricks in the structure,

then,

is

The most

are clear case laws

and codes.
Philosophical and theological categories by their very
abstraction can easily change and mislead.

Thus the function

of a Halakhist is to decide - to adjudicate - the correct
religious
survives.

law in particular cases.

If he succeeds,

God is in the Halakhic details.

the Halakha

For this function

it is best to use clear precedents and apply them as closely as
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possible.

According to this view,

the Halakha is

less

interested in cosmic principles than it is with clear action
guides and rules.
not theology,

As Rabbi Danzinger has put

it is Divine Anthropology."

it,

"Halakha

is

3

Thus Bleich writes:
It should be clearly understood that the question of
whether or not the fetus is a person or "full human
being" is largely irrelevant in Halakhic context . .
It is the nature of the prohibition and the specific
regulations which are significant.
Not matters of
nomenclature which are of no Halakhic significance.4

.

Similarly Carmy states:
For me, abortion on demand is prohibited because
Halakha says so and that's that.
Thus a philosophical
argument on abortion is . . . without practical
implication for our lives.^
Moreover it is not only philosophical

abstractions or notions

from external secular sources that cannot be used in this
adjudication process as Bleich has said,
one may present one's views and those of liberal
Judaism as forcefully and eloquently as one is able.
Conceivably one may even argue that they are in
keeping if not with the letter of the law with the
spirit of Judaic values.
But surely one should be
mindful not to misrepresent Talmudic law or impugn the
position of Rabbinic Judaism.6
Bleich argues here that even if
consistent with a
relevant.

"Jewish values" were

liberal view on abortion that that is not

Only the law as adjudicated by legalistic "Rabbinic

Judaism" can serve as valid action guide.
shall see,

Of course,

as we

Bleich ignores those Rabbinic decisions which are

more lenient on abortion.
The physician-scholar Mark Adler echoes a similar view:
For the orthodox Jew, medical ethics are based on
divine law rather than philosophy.
These laws
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therefore are not subject to the whims of society
. . . By the religious anchoring of medical ethics one
is assured of a standard to be followed in every
generation in every social milieu.
The advantage of
anchoring medical ethics in an inviolate law rather
than a personal ethic . . . was demonstrated in recent
history [i.e. the Nazi period].7
And finally R.

Stienberg states:

Regardless of the philosophical and moral arguments
both pro and con . . . the only valid approach for a
committed Jew is to seek the guidance of Halakha and
follow the solution of Jewish law.8
This avoidance of philosophy is perhaps best stated by
Steinsatz in reference not to contemporary authors but to the
authors of the Talmud:
A basic factor in the attitude toward abstraction is a
deliberate evasion of abstract thinking based on
abstract concepts.
Rather we employ models in place
of abstract concepts.
The model is utilized in
accordance with a series of clearly defined steps
approved by tradition . . . abstract concepts are
replaced by many illustrative examples . . . The
weakness of all abstract thought lies in the fact that
it is constantly creating new terms and concepts . . .
we can never know whether they constitute a departure
from the subject or are still relevant.9
The models referred to by Steinsatz are specific codes of
law or case law.
any abstraction;
source.

Steinsatz expresses the danger inherent

in

it easily moves away from the concrete

A specific ruling in a religious case is concrete and

unchanging and can thereby "preserve"
considerations,

on the other hand,

the law.

Philosophical

are fluid and will only lead

to a departure from the relevant case material.
If Steinsatz were correct, we may understand why it has
been so difficult to extract the intent of the text.
cannot impose abstract categories
arisen a millenium later)

For we

(especially those that have

on the text.

It may simply make no
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sense to ask,

for example, what is the talmudic stand on the

ontological status of the fetus.

This question doesn't fit

since the talmudic view is inductive rather than deductive.
There may simply not be any central

"notion"

from which the other rules are derivable.
view of the fetus is simply the totality of

about the fetus

Rather,

the talmudic

its rulings and

comments on the fetus.
Although there is something strangely attractive about
Steinsatz’s theory, we will ultimately have to reject
simply cannot accept a mode of

it.

We

interpretation that does not

involve abstractions and generalizing principles,

as we shall

argue in the next chapter.
The stringent orthodox position is not merely claiming that
its method of interpretation is

legalistic but also that its

method puts it in continuity with the Halakha itself.
while claiming to be merely reporting what
writings of previous authorities,

Thus

is inherent in the

they claim the "mantle"

of

these authorities for their decisions.

Section 4.

Summary

We have shown that the stringent orthodox camp views
Halakha as absolute,

complete,

consistent and unchanging.

Philosophical and theological considerations,
Jewish or secular sources,
Halakhic ruling.

whether from

are irrelevant in adjudicating a

Only a strict

legalistic method of comparison

with established Halakhic law and case material
the Responsa)

is relevant.

(from,

e.g.,

Ethical complexity is preserved not
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in theological meditation but

in concrete acts governed by a

concrete law of cases.
Yet there is no real clarification as to how,
literature as complex as the Halakhic views of
actually goes about
conclusions.

given a

abortion,

one

interpreting cases and applying

Rather a naive view is proposed that both

empowers the Halakhist with the authority of his predecessors
while simultaneously claiming no personal bias or
power

is involved in the Halakhic decision-making.

to a critique of this position.

legislating
We turn now

Chapter V
The Nature of the Halakhic Process

Section 1.
Green,

Introduction
1

Lubarsky,

2

Greenberg,

3

Biale,

4.5
Gordis

and others have criticized the conservative and antimodern
nature of the restrictive orthodox position on abortion.
this chapter and the next,

we will present

In

a new approach

toward an understanding and critique of this position.

This

approach will supply a unified framework borrowed from the
judicial theory of Benjamin Cordozo.^

It is based on a

serious consideration of the stringent orthodox claim
concerning the legalistic nature of Halakhic interpretation.
To the best of our knowledge,

this approach is original with

this paper as other critics have approached the stringent
orthodox view and method by applying religious

rather than

legal analysis.
Cordozo’s thesis,

as we shall see,

is that there is no such

thing as a purely legal method based solely on making
comparative juxtapositions of precedent case material.

Rather,

there is a continuum of abstraction or generalization that must
intervene.

Moreover,

at each step of the process choices must

be made and these are more often than not the site for the
introduction of personal bias and beliefs.
Cordozo,

every judge

(read Halakhist)

is a

Thus,

according to

legislator.
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Section 2.

Cordozo *s Framework

Since the stringent orthodox camp has insisted that
position can only be understood as a

legalistic one, we will

organize our critique as an analysis of methods of
interpretation and adjudication.

its

legal

Benjamin Cordozo has

formulated an elegant and forceful argument on the subject
his book.

The Nature of the Judicial Process.

very different

legal system,

Cordozo's analysis

in

Written about a

nevertheless the structure of

is equally valid for religious

law.

We will

find it constructive to borrow Cordozo's framework and
categories .
To begin, we recall a quote from R.
to one from Cordozo.

Bleich and juxtapose it

The similarity speaks for itself:

Bleich:
Often it is the need of the hour a specific query or
problem which serves as the impetus to discover what
has been inherent in the Halakha from the moment of
its inception . . . the investigation serves to reveal
that which had already been available [in the
Halakha].7
Cordozo:
The theory of older writers [on legal method] was that
judges did not legislate at all.
A preexisting rule
was there embedded if concealed in the body of the
customary law.
All that the judges did was to throw
off the wrappings and expose the statue to view.8
It is this "naive" view of interpretation that Cordozo
takes to task.

Cordozo lays the foundation of his argument as

follows:
What is it that I do when I decide a case?
To what
sources of information do I appeal for guidance?
In
what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the
result?
In what proportions ought they to
contribute?
If a precedent is applicable, when do I
refuse to follow it?
If no precedent is applicable.
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how do I reach the rule that will make a precedent for
the future?
If I am seeking logical consistency, the
symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek
it?
At what point shall the quest be halted by some
discrepant custom, by some consideration of the social
welfare by my own or the common standards of justice
and morals? . . . Some principle however unavowed and
inarticulate and subconscious has regulated the
[decision] ... In such attempt at analyses as I
shall make there will be need to distinguish between
the conscious and the subconscious.
I do not mean
that even those considerations and motives which I
shall class under the first head are always in
consciousness distinctly so that they will be
recognized and named at sight.
Not infrequently they
hover near the surface.
They may, however, with
comparative readiness be isolated and tagged and when
thus labeled are quickly acknowledged as guiding
principles of conduct.
More subtle are the forces so
far beneath the surface that they cannot reasonably be
classified as other than subconscious.
It is often
through these subconscious forces that judges are kept
consistent with themselves and inconsistent with one
another.
We are reminded by William James in a
telling page of his lectures on Pragmatism that every
one of us has in truth an underlying philosophy of
life, even those of us to whom the names and notions
of philosophy are unknown or anethema . . . All their
lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot
name have been tugging at them - inherited instincts,
traditional beliefs, acquired convictions, and the
result is an outlook on life, a conception of social
needs, a sense, in James’ phrase, of "the total push
and pressure of the cosmos" which, when reasons are
nicely balanced must determine where choice shall
fall. 9
It is certainly a testament to Cordozo's insight that the
above passage fits our discussion so well.

Cordozo begins his

formulation by separating out two related aspects of the
judicial process.

First is the question of the legal

methodology and here Cordozo recognizes that precedent

is only

a small part of the judicial

the use

armamentarium.

Moreover,

of precedent is more complex than would at first appear.
Second is the question of the extra-legal attitudes and beliefs
that a justice brings to the complex legal method.

Cordozo
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stresses the individual predilections here.

However,

for our

purposes we might recognize as well institutional and
historical biases that might affect an entire class or group of
scholars working from a similar socio-ethica1 background.

Thus

a source for systematic bias is introduced.
Cordozo goes on to discuss the question of

legal

methodology,
The first thing he [a justice] does is to compare the
case before him with the precedents, whether stored in
his mind or hidden in the books.
I do not mean that
precedents are ultimate sources of the law supplying
the sole equipment that is needed for the legal
armory, the sole tools. . . . Back of precedents are
the basic judicial conceptions which are the
postulates of judicial reasoning and farther back are
the habits of life, the institutions of society in
which those conceptions had their origin and which, by
a process of interaction, they have modified in
turn.
In examining precedents,
of life"

one must be aware of the "habits

and "institutions" within which these precedents came

to be established.

As Cordozo points out,

often the law and

its contextual society are mutually reinforcing a sort of
institutional symbiosis.
precedent,

Yet we must ask when quoting a

Has the context now changed?

Are we still

living

with the same habits that gave it value and meaning?
Finding the correct precedents,
be,

as difficult as this might

is only the beginning:
. . . The problem which confronts the judge is in
reality a twofold one:
he must first extract from the
precedent the underlying principle, the ratio
decidendi; he must then determine the path or
direction along which the principle is to move and
develop.
. . . The first branch of the problem is the
one to which we are accustomed to address ourselves
more consciously than to the other.
Cases do not
unfold their principles for the asking.
They yield up
their kernel slowly and painfully . . .
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There is a constant need, as every law student
knows, to separate the accidental and the nonessential
from the essential and the inherent.H
In attempting to apply a precedent,

then,

one is faced with

three related tasks,

each of which is again a possible source

of systematic bias.

First,

from the accidental.

one must separate the essential

We will see in the following chapter that

a considerable portion of the disagreement concerning the
interpretation of classic Halakha on abortion revolves
precisely on the point of what in a given precedent
essential and what is merely accidental.

is

It becomes especially

important for our discussion as the precedent cases are very
specific and tend to contain particular circumstances as we
have seen.

For example,

many lenient rulings are dismissed as

turning on a particular unusual situation and therefore not
applicable to general circumstances.
A second task is the extraction of principle from the
precedent case.

This is related to the notion of

generalization but

is broader.

Much like the previous task,

this is open to considerable bias.

It is also related to the

question of how narrowly or broadly to interpret a precedent.
How much information does it contain?
from it?

Notice,

however,

How much can we derive

that we must abstract some principle

from a case in order to apply it,

according to Cordozo.

Cordozo will argue that this abstraction is where any justice
willy-nilly introduces his own "philosophy."
quoted in the previous chapter by Bleich,

The remarks

Cormy,

Adler and

Steinberg eschewing the use of philosophy or general ethics are
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simply untenable.

To read a precedent case law and to then

apply it requires generalizing,
requires abstract

extracting principles,

legal and moral categories.

it

Moreover,

it

should be clear that the degree of generalization will depend
to a great extent on how "close" to our current question the
precedent case law is.

The "closer"

it is the less abstraction

we need in order to make the comparison.

On the other hand,

we wish to derive principle from "distant" precedent,
a different branch of
generalization,

e.g.

if

from

law, we need a much greater

a grander abstraction.

We will come back to

this point in the next chapter where we discuss the ways that
other areas of Halakha have been applied to the abortion
issue.

For example,

the Halakha concerning the Sabbath or the

Halakha concerning treatment of terminally ill.

When these

precedents are used to argue for a particular position in the
abortion discussion,

the arguments necessarily involve

extraction of broader principles and abstractions allowing more
room for systematic bias,

as we shall demonstrate.

Thus a sort

of inverse proportionality exists between the "closeness" of a
precedent to its application and the degree to which
abstraction and bias enter into the judicial or Halakhic
process.
Cordozo's analysis continues:
Let us assume, however, that this task has been
achieved and that the precedent is known as it really
is.
Let us assume too that the principle, latent
within it, has been skillfully extracted and
accurately stated. Only half or less than half of the
work has yet been done.
The problem remains to fix
the bounds and tendencies of development and growth to
act as the directive force in motion along the right
path at the parting of the ways.
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The directive force of a principle may be exerted
along the line of logical progression, this I will
call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy,
along the line of historical development this I will
call the method of evolution, along the lines of
customs of the community this I will call method of
tradition, along the lines of morals and social
welfare, the mores of the day and this I will call the
method of sociology.12
This dense paragraph contains the core of Cordozo’s thesis
which we will attempt to summarize.

Again,

the focus is on how

we interpret a precedent and then attempt to apply that
interpretation in the judicial situation.
extracted a principle from the case,

Once we have

Cordozo claims there are

various factors that influence the way this principle is used
or applied.

First is the method of analogy or philosophy.

have already discussed this to some extent.

We

This involves the

question of how broadly a principle can be extracted.

What

cases are sufficiently analogous to be influenced by the
principle?

How far will we abstract the principle?

How do our

underlying beliefs effect these decisions?
Second is the method of history or evolution.

Cordozo is

here referring to the concept that any precedent and its
extracted principle exist within an historical context and may
have to evolve with the changing historical context.
Cordozo quotes Holmes,
logic.”

13

As

"a page of history is worth a volume of

Or more clearly:

The point is rather that the conceptions [of law]
themselves have come to us from without, not from
within.
That they embody the thought not so much of
the present as of the past that separated from the
past their form and meaning are unintelligible and
arbitrary and hence that their development in order to
be truly logical must be mindful of their origins.14
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Both Green^ and Gordis^6 make similar arguments concerning
the proper understanding and use of Halakha from its historical
context.
Third is the role that customs and tradition,
these are not

legally binding,

even when

play on the understanding of

principles and their application.

As Cordozo says:

We look to custom not so much for the creation of new
rules but for the tests and standards that are to
determine how established rules shall be applied.17
This is especially significant within an orthodox religious
community in which tradition and preservation of customs is so
important for maintaining a sense of identity and a group
boundary.
It is easy to see how customs which are not Halakhic can
take on an almost moral force and be confused with truly
binding religious

law.

This is another source of systematic

bias that orthodox scholars are especially vulnerable to.
any complex religion has a literature,

a

As

law and a practice,

it

becomes difficult at times to separate the incidental customary
practice from the law.
Fourth is the consideration of social welfare or the method
of sociology.
. . . There are times when we must bend symmetry,
ignore history and sacrifice custom in pursuit of
other and larger ends . . . The final cause of law is
the welfare of society.1®
However,

Cordozo cautions that often it is a particular

justice’s view of the welfare of society,

or a particular view

of social morality or one set of imposed ideas of the "ideal"
society that influences the way a justice
interpret and apply principles.

[or Halakhist] will
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We must ask,

are certain opinions on Halakha and abortion

influenced by a scholar’s view of the role of women or the
ideal of

Mfamily?"

More concretely,

many Halakhic authors in

discussing abortion speak of the need to "repopulate” the
Jewish community in the wake of the holocaust.
have these notions of

"social welfare"

To what extent

influenced the process

of Halakhic interpretation?
Cordozo summarizes the complexity of the judicial process
thus :
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this
and little more:
logic and history and custom and
utility and the accepted standards of the right
conduct are the forces which singly or in combination
shape the progress of the law.
Which of these forces
shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon
the comparative importance or value of the social
interests that will thereby be promoted or
impaired.19
It should be clear that this describes anyone who would attempt
to interpret the classical Halakha.
that the Halakha

rules a certain way.

input that each of Cordozo's

It is not enough to claim
One must consider the

"categories of influence" has on

any Halakhic scholar.

Section 3.

Summary

We recapitulate the points most important for our
discussion:

the nature of

interpreting and applying any legal

literature based on case law involves a complex interaction of
many factors.

Each justice or Halakhist brings to the task a

system of conscious and also subconscious beliefs.

These

beliefs may be personal or a shared system of assumptions

60

derived from the “push and pull" of a particular social ethical
milieu.

When searching for

legal precedents,

a justice or

Halakhist may be biased in his choices and his opinion of which
precedents are truly relevant.

In examining a precedent,

the

essential must be distinguished from the accidental and here
too the scholar may be influenced by a particular belief.
Once the precedent has been chosen and its essential nature
discerned,

it cannot simply be compared to the situation or

case under consideration.
principle,

Cordozo insists that we extract a

some kind of generalizing or abstraction step must

intervene between precedent and its application.

Here again

different scholars will often see different principles in the
same precedent.

Moreover,

the level of abstraction will depend

on how closely related the precedent is to the case under
consideration.
example,
abstract,

If

it is from a different branch of

law,

for

the principle extracted will tend to be very broad and
to cover

legal

issues spanning many areas.

Thus

principles derived from precedent and more general ethical or
philosophical principles are not distinct but according to
Cordozo form a continuum.
very narrowly,

On one end, we interpret a precedent

deriving a very circumscribed principle.

On the

other end, we hold certain broad and general moral principles,
almost unconsciously,
precedents.
"extra

and may just

"hang"

them on to particular

This is what Sandra Lubarsky calls,

legal elements."

from adjudication.

for example,

There is no way to separate philosophy
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Cordozo also discusses the application and development of
the legal principles once they have been extracted.

Here we

must be careful to distinguish their source from their intended
application.

We must be aware of the historical context of

principle and also how that context has changed so that a
principle which has a certain meaning and function in its
original context may be distorted by application to changed
historical context.

Similarly, we must consider the customs,

traditions and mores that gave birth to a particular principle
and not attempt to force its application onto a changed set of
customs and mores.

Finally the interpreter is aware of the

social consequences that the principle may have had in its
original context as well as being aware of his own beliefs and
aspirations for society which may effect the understanding and
application of

legal principle.

In other words, we must be

aware of the teleological cause of our Halakhic decisions.
In the next chapter, we will apply Cordozo's framework to
the analysis of stringent orthodox position.

We will discover

the methodological sources of bias in selection of precedents,
extraction of principles,
principles.

and application of these generalized

We will also attempt to unearth the underlying

philosophical theological assumptions as well as the
teleological causes that underlie the stringent position.

Chapter VI
Critique of the Stringent Position

Section 1.

Introduction

In this chapter we apply the framework based on Cordozo’s
work to an understanding and critique of the stringent orthodox
position.

In Section 2, which we can consider the "evidence"

portion of our argument,

we will demonstrate a systematic bias

in the stringent position's interpretation of the classical
Halakhic precedents.

We will

review several of the important

texts already mentioned in chapter 2 and introduce other
Halakhic material that has been used as precedent

in the

Halakhic discussion of abortion.
We hope to show that the bias is introduced at several of
the methodologic levels introduced by Cordozo:
precedents,

selection of

separation of essential from accidental factors,

extrication of principles and application of principles.
Moreover,

as we search for

legal precedents applicable to

abortion in other areas of Jewish law we will find that broader
generalization and hence greater danger for bias
introduced.

is

This will be the topic of Section 3.

In Section 4 we will and attempt to excavate the underlying
philosophical
camp.

and theological presuppositions of the stringent

These are the often unacknowledged assumptions that

determine the consistency and systematic nature of the bias
which enters

into Halakhic adjudication at the task points
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mentioned above.

This section is somewhat risky,

as we can

only make a good guess as to what the underlying belief
structure of a group might be.

Nevertheless, we feel our

suggestions capture the essence of these underlying
structures.

Moreover, we find confirmation for these belief

structures from the fact that the critiques of Lubarsky'*' and
Green

2

described in chapter 4 can easily be derived from

these assumptions.
In Section 5 we consider what we have called the
teleological causes of bias or what Cordozo calls the method of
sociology.
jurist,

This involves the notion that a Halakhist,

often decides on the basis of his aspirations for the

consequences of
"legislation"

Section 2;
A.

like a

laws.

Thus a Halakhic decision may involve

for the social welfare.

Precedent and Principle.

The Method of Analogy

When Men Fight
We have already mentioned the Biblical passage:
When men fight and one of them pushes a pregnant woman
and a miscarriage results, but no other misfortune
ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according
as the woman's husband may exact from him.
But if
other misfortune ensues the penalty shall be life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.
[Exodus 21:22]
As we have seen in chapter 2,

most scholars who are lenient

on abortion take this passage as a precedent.

They note the

distinction drawn between the loss of the fetus and the loss of
an adult life.
murder.

The principle extracted is that feticide is not

Others would choose to draw even broader principles.
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e.g.

that the fetus has no status as a person.

Yet even the

narrowest interpretation would not support a strict prohibition
on abortion.

The only way out of this conclusion is not to

accept this passage as a precedent at all.
the position Steinberg has taken.

This is precisely

Noting the accidental nature

of the abortion he finds that
The Bible herein is not referring at all to induced
abortion in the usual sense which is when the mother
needs or request an abortion for any reason.3
Here we have an example of systematic bias working at
Cordozo’s very first task,
precedent case material.
intent,

that of determining the relevant
Steinberg,

focusing on the lack of

concludes that we can derive no principle from this

passage concerning intentional abortion.

To us this does not

seem to be a close adherence to the traditional
rather a biased and selective approach,

literature but

a predetermined

conclusion about abortion that will force the text to comply.
B.

The Difficult Labor
We have already mentioned the Mishna in oholot which

commands fetal dismemberment during a difficult

labor.

The

fetus is contrasted with the baby once it has emerged, when its
status is equal to the mother’s.

Here we find the two camps

dividing along Cordozo's second task,
essential.

determining what is

The permissive camp focuses on the status of the

unborn fetus as the essential governing fact
principle extracted is,

therefore,

in the case.

The

that the fetus is not a

person and therefore it does not enjoy the same protection a
person can claim.

There may be a variety of circumstances

under which we may permit

its abortion.
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The stringent orthodox position focuses on the danger to
the mother's

life as the essential part of the case and draws

the very opposite principle.
It is evident from the Mishna that were the fetus not
endangering the mother's life prior to its birth, it
would certainly be forbidden to destroy it.4
Given the paucity of Talmudic material on abortion one may
wonder why the exceptional case allowing abortion is
rather than the rule that states
Yet,

this

"it

recorded

is certainly forbidden."

is the perfect example of Cordozo's point that

underlying belief completely determines one's
a Halakhic ruling.
self-evident that
a precedent

interpretation of

For the stringent scholars,
abortion is forbidden.

in which it

is permitted,

it

is

When the Mishna cites

this case is understood

as the rare exception proving the rule.
To the more permissive camp,

on the other hand,

the case

establishes the principle that maternal well being determines
when abortion is permitted,
straightforward

interpretation of the text.

not arguing now for the
there is

which seems closer to the

a choice of

latter position,

Note that we are

only pointing out that

interpretations and a bias that determines

how one chooses.
C.

Maimonides

and the Concent of Aggressor

Maimonides codifies the above ruling and then adds that the
fetus

is there

likened to a pursuer

permitted to kill.
literally dozens of
Maimonides’

[aggressor] whom it is

Feldman has shown that there are
interpretations and explanations for

additional comment.^

The stringent camp
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understands his ruling with the narrowest interpretation.
R.

Thus

Soloveitchik has written:
A fetus too is considered a person. It is only because
of the law of saving one who is pursued that there is
the ruling that the fetus is a person is put aside.7

David Bleich has followed this
that only when the fetus

logic even further,

claiming

is the "proximate cause of the threat

g

to the mother"
states

can we consider abortion.

"Maimonides'

Moreover,

he

comment serves to establish that feticide

. .
9
is a form of noncapital homicide."

For

it

is homicide that

is usually justified in the law by appeal to the aggressor
concept.
Once again,
is essential

we find the stringent camp declaring that what

in the Maimonides

fetus as aggressor.
aggressor

ruling

is the notion of the

That only because the fetus

in this particular case may we abort.

extracted from Maimonides'

ruling

is that

is an
The principle

abortion is forbidden

except under the unusual circumstance where the fetus
as aggressor on its mother's
Notice that Maimonides'
one.

is seen

life.
ruling is basically a permissive

He states that we must kill the fetus to save the

mother's

life.

Yet the stringent camp would draw a

principle from his

ruling.

restrictive

The whole notion of aggressor may

simply be introduced as an explanation and is not the essence
of the ruling.
authorities

As Rachel Biale points out,

reject the notion that it is only because the fetus

is an aggressor that we may destroy it.
concept

many earlier

For

is the essential point of the ruling,

if the aggressor
why is the infant
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baby,

once it has emerged,

any less an aggressor?

Why may we

not destroy an infant on the same basis?
Rather,
is essential

it seems clear to more lenient scholars that what
in this case is the lesser status of the unborn

fetus versus the status of the mother.
D.

The Condemned Mother and Her Fetus
Recall the Mishna in Arakin 7a.

This ruling states that we

do not force the mother to wait and endure anguish in order
that the fetus might be saved.

Many authors have drawn a

principle from this precedent that
allowable reason for abortion,
medical.

Biale quotes R.

ruling on this source.

"great need" constitutes an

even if that need is not

Emden

(18th century)

as basing his

"Clearly abortion is not forbidden when

it is done because of great need."10
The restrictive camp has chosen again to find the
"essentials" of this precedent to be unique and unusual
circumstances and therefore they simply do not use this as a
precedent

in considering abortion.

The pattern is consistent

with systematic bias.
According to R.

Feinstein,

for example,

we can draw no

principle from this case because the fetus is condemned to
death,

together with its mother,

at the moment of sentencing.

Only this odd circumstance allows us to prioritize the mother's
well being.

Under other circumstances,

only an actual threat to mother's

Feinstein rules,

that

life would allow abortion.11

The attempt to exclude this precedent from any useful
interpretation or application forces some serious

logical
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difficulties.
of a crime

First,

if the fetus can forfeit

(any capital crime)

certainly it must have far

its life because

committed by its mother,

less status than a person.

Recall

that the Bible is very clear in regards to visiting the sin of
the parent upon the child.

To say the fetus

its mother is to say the fetus

is

"part" of

is condemned with
its mother without

individuality and we have no duties to preserve it.
even if

it

is true that the fetus

why does the mother’s
too is condemned.

Second,

is condemned with its mother,

interest predominate?

At this point she

We have two condemned beings and the Talmud

is clear whose interest predominates.
Regarding this Mishna and the previously mentioned Mishna,
Steinberg has written ’’the common denominator
mentioned in the Talmud

.

is the existence of specific infrequent

.

and exceptional conditions”
circumstances

is

12

and only because of these

abortion allowed.

the common denominator

in the cases

It seems equally likely that

is that both rulings establish a

lenient

precedent.
E.

Uber Yerek Immo - Pars Viscerum Matris
Although the cases we have cited so far are the only

Talmudic references to abortion,
legal

status of the fetus

the Talmud does discuss the

in Gitten 23b and Hulin 58a.

phrase used in these contexts

is

"uber yerek immo,"

One

the

equivalent of the Latin phrase pars viscerum matris - the fetus
is as a

limb of

its mother.

tions of ownership,

This designation refers to ques¬

conversion,

capacity to own property.

levitical purity and the fetus’

For example, with few exceptions,

transactions made on behalf of a fetus are not binding.

13

any
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Taken together,

these references are usually understood to

mean that the fetus has no "juridicial" personality.

Although

this has no direct bearing on the question of abortion,

these

precedents and rulings do differentiate the fetus and should be
considered seriously.

Instead, we find a total

rejection of

these notions by writers who claim to adhere strictly to every
word of the Talmud.

Thus Rosner:

The Talmud compares the unborn fetus to an extra
appendage of the mother . . .
However, how can one
compare the unborn fetus to a finger of the mother
. . . the unborn fetus, if left alone, would develop
into a full and complete human being.-1-4
Similarly,

Bleich states,

the mother but a being

"The fetus

in its own right."

is not an appendage to
15

Clearly these

authors do not

intend to argue with the plain meaning of the

text.

they are excluding these rulings from

Rather,

consideration as precedents
on the other hand,

relevant to abortion.

Aptowitzer,

takes this material more seriously and sees

in it evidence of a division of opinion in the Talmud on the
fundamental status of the fetus. ^
F.

Maya Balma - It

is Mere Fluid

In the sources quoted so far,

it would seem that the Talmud

does not distinguish between different stages of a pregnancy.
However,

the Talmud does,

in one instance,

distinguish the

first forty days of pregnancy from the rest.
The ruling involves the law of priestly tithes.
daughter may benefit from the tithe donations as
part of her father's household.

A priest's

long as she is

If she is married or a mother,

she no longer counts as part of her father's household.

The
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Talmud in Yevomoth 69b then discusses what the rule is for a
childless recent widow.

The ruling is that she belongs to her

father's household immediately upon being widowed.
she were to be unknowingly pregnant,

For even if

for the first forty days,

the fetus is mava balma - merely fluid.

Thus,

a woman is not

considered pregnant for the first forty days.
Clearly the Talmud recognized a distinction between the
very early part of gestation and

later pregnancy.

This case

presents a difficult challenge to anyone attempting Cordozo's
set of tasks for interpretation.
of this ruling?

What is the essential aspect

One could choose to read this case very

narrowly as referring only to the legal
pregnant state for the mother.

recognition of the

One might even argue that the

Talmud is merely recognizing the difficulty of establishing
pregnancy for the first forty days.

On the other hand,

one

might choose to draw broader conclusions about the status of
the early fetus concluding that abortion at this stage is
completely permitted.
Interestingly,

rather than draw even the most narrow

permissive principle from this rule,

Carmy has focused on the

ruling as a proof text for the status of the fetus after forty
days of gestation.

He recognizes three categories as a result

of this

Before forty days,

ruling.

1)

the fetus is not a human

being but is a potential human being and abortion is prohibited
because one may not destroy even potential
forty days,

life.

2) After

the fetus is human but not fully fledged human

being; during this period abortion is prohibited because it

is
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similar to murder.

3) At birth the infant becomes fully equal

to other human beings.

17

Here again we find a stringent

principle extracted from what seems to be a more lenient ruling.
In contrast,

R. Weinberg has used this precedent to

establish the principle that prior to forty days abortion is
permitted for any reason and the difficult questions only arise
after the fortieth gestational day.
G.

18

Post Natal Viability
Another area of the law is related to the above discussion

because it too can be seen as recognizing an evolving process
in human development
The Mishna

rather than a single fixed status.

in Sanhedrin 79a states that if one kills a

prematurely born infant,
punishment.
until

one is not

liable for capital

A premature born infant

is not considered viable

it has survived for thirty days.

Moreover,

never know if an infant is full term or premature,
rules

if one kills any infant before thirty days,

held liable for capital punishment.

since we can
the Talmud
he cannot be

This certainly does not in

anyone's mind make infanticide permissible.

As we have seen,

once the infant

is born we must even let its mother die rather

than touch it.

The question only arises after the fact.

one commits infanticide,

can we execute him?

If

The answer is no,

because he may have destroyed a nonviable life for which
capital punishment cannot be extracted.
The Mishna

in Moed Katan 22a reinforces this notion of a

distinction in status between an infant
and one greater than thirty days.

less than thirty days

The ruling

is that one does
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not recite Kaddish

[mourner’s benediction]

nor does one offer

the usual prescribed condolences for an infant of

less than

thirty days.
Green

19

has suggested that these rulings represent a

recognition of a process of development and maturation and
social incorporation.

All of which are stages that a

fertilized ovum must pass through before we recognize it as a
full-fledged member of the community of persons.
In commenting on the same material,
that ’’Willful destruction of the fetus

Bleich has concluded
[at any stage]

is a

capital crime except Halakha recognizes degrees of
viability.”
material

20

[emphasis added]

Bleich thus interprets this

in the narrowest fashion.

He argues,

in other words,

that the fetus has an equal ontological status with other
persons,

as does the infant and the premature infant.

only that we need to prove "viability"

It is

in order to punish the

capital crime.
H.

Violating the Sabbath and the Dav of Atonement
There is a well-established rule in Jewish law that peril

to life suspends all religious duties and prohibitions with
three exceptions.
incest.

[The exceptions are idolatry,

murder and

One must suffer death rather than violate these.]

particular,

In

the laws of Sabbath or the Day of Atonement may be

suspended in cases of mortal danger.

21

There are two relevant Talmudic rulings.

In Arakin 7b the

Talmud states that if a woman dies in childbirth,

one brings

the surgical knife even on Sabbath to extract and save the
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fetus.

The second case involves a pregnant woman who

experiences overpowering hunger pains during the Day of
Atonement

[which is a fast].

The Talmud in Yoma 82a stipulates

that she may partake of the food she craves

lest she suffer

miscarriage and the fetus die.
The stringent camp has drawn broad principles from these
rulings concerning the status of the fetus.

Recall that many

of these authors refused to interpret far more direct texts as
relevant to the status of the fetus.

In particular,

Bleich has

written "suspension of such significant religious observance
[Sabbath or the Day of Atonement]

is incompatible with an

indiscriminate license to destroy

[the]

fetus]."

22

life

[of a

The argument is that since the Talmud allows this

desecration for the fetus,

it must be a "person."

This broad construction is rather forced,
points out.

as Feldman

Notice that in regard to these precedents,

23
it is

the lenient camp which is forced into a narrow interpretation.
The dilemma here is analogous to the one faced by contemporary
physicians in treating fetal disease.

If we treat fetal

disease or violate the Sabbath to protect the fetus, we are
implicitly recognizing the fetus as a valued individual.
Certainly most of us would not want to withhold such aid.
once granted,

can we then justify abortion on the basis of

diametric opposed argument?

We will

leave this open.

Yet
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I.

The Argument from Silence
We have discussed how one can draw biased sets of

principles out of a given system of precedents.
principle from the absence of precedent?
does.

Can we draw a

Steinberg apparently

Noting that there is no discussion in the Halakha of

what we call today

‘abortion on demand,’

Steinberg argues from

this silence:
Apparently murder of fetuses has never existed in
Jewish society during any period and thus there was no
need for a specific discussion of this problem.24
The more lenient camp sees a different principle operating
•

•

•

in this silence.

Biale

25

has argued that women who wanted an

abortion have simply not asked their Rabbis'

opinion.

Blu

Greenberg draws precisely the opposite conclusion that
Steinberg does,

namely that the silence affords us an

opportunity for

leniency.

There may be no responsa giving

permission for abortion on demand,

but then there are none that

prohibit it by the same argument.

More eloquently:

Since there is no precedent for what we call abortion
on demand, one obvious way to maintain some integrity
within the Halakhic framework would be to broaden the
interpretation of therapeutic abortion to extend the
principle of precedence of the mother's actual life
and health to include serious regard for the quality
of life as well.
And there exists in the Halakha
literature . . . respected Halakhists [who] moved from
purely physical to mental and emotional considerations
of the mother which is what the current abortion issue
is all about.26
F.

The Nature of the Prohibition
Interestingly,

the actual source and nature of the

prohibition against abortion is disputed even within the
stringent orthodox camp.

A.

Steinberg writes:
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All agree that some prohibition against inducing
abortion does exist.
However, we find differences of
opinion as to the nature, severity and grounds for
this prohibition according to strict Halakhic ruling
and criteria . . . All agree it is not actually
murder.27
Bleich

28

agrees with Steinberg and points out that

it

is

not even certain if the prohibition is actually Biblical or
only a later Rabbinical edict.

Yet despite not being able to

ground these prohibitions in a substantial way,
insists that

it

their camp

is strictly prohibited.

The approach taken to locating the category of offense
involved in abortion has been to seek precedents and attempt to
include abortion under their wing.

Thus Steinberg:

"we

attempt to refer this prohibition to other existing and
accepted prohibitions in the Bible
offshoot of other forbidden acts."
1.

[thus]

making abortion an

29

Abortion as Murder

Despite Steinberg's claim above that all agree that
abortion is not murder,
as a type of murder.

some authors would categorize abortion

Bleich quotes R. Mizrahi

as holding the

opinion that abortion is actually in principle
indistinguishable from murder.

The difference in practice is

that since we cannot be sure any fetus is viable, we cannot
treat its destroyer as a murderer.
the act of murder.

However,

the act

remains

30

Given the contradictory Talmudic statements about the
relation of abortion to murder, we find this position
unsubstantiated and most authors would not agree with
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R. Mizrahi.
R.

A similar position,

however,

has been taken by

Feinstein in a telegram deploring the legalization of

abortion in Israel.
We are stirred to the depths of our souls [hearing]
the report . . . that the Knesset accepted and
affirmed the immoral law which legalized abortion even
where in the opinion of expert physicians there is no
danger to life ... We hereby state with absolute
finality that a law which says you can abort a child
prior to its birth is tantamount to murder ... It
soils the good name ... of all who stood at Sinai
heard and accepted the commandment "Thou shall not
murder" . . . Israel must serve as a model to the
world on how to conduct a sacred and pure family life
and not, God forbid, the reverse.31
It seems unusual to us that Feinstein would refer to the
sanctity of family life in the context of discussing abortion
unless the latter has influenced his judgment on the former.
2.

Abortion as Failure to Procreate

A second approach views abortion as running counter to the
Biblical summons

"Be fruitful and multiply"

and also includes

abortion with the interdiction against onanism.

Bleich points

out that technically if this were the source for the
prohibition,

then the prohibition would be limited to the

parents of the fetus,

since one is only responsible for having

one's own children under this
Moreover,

law.

32

Jochele has pointed out that the Biblical phrase

"'Be fruitful and multiply’

is not

...

a binding religious

commandment but was explicitly meant as a blessing."

33

This sort of consideration would obliterate the distinction
between abortion before or after forty days of gestation.
importantly,

More

it would blur the distinction between an abstract
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increasing of

life and an actual individual fetus.

We shall

return to this issue later in the chapter.
3.

Abortion as Illegal Wounding

A third approach has been to see abortion as a form of
"wounding.”

34

It is a well established Jewish law that one

may not unnecessarily wound oneself or others.

This

law has

even been used by some to prohibit purely cosmetic surgery.
Paradoxically,

the source of wounding prohibition is the text:

And it shall be if the wicked man shall be worthy to
be beaten . . . forty stripes he [the judge] may give
him and not exceed lest if he should exceed and beat
him above these with many stripes then thy brother
should seem vile unto thee.
[Deuteronomy 25:2-3]
The principle derived is that if the Bible cautions so
carefully against not "wounding"

in excess for a convict,

much more so for an innocent person.
however,

It

how

remains unclear,

if the wounding would refer to the fetus or to the

mother who is undergoing "unnecessary surgery" by having an
abortion.
4.

Abortion as a Special Rabbinic Prohibition

A fourth approach,

finding no convincing precedent or

analogy under which to include the prohibition of abortion,
claims that

it is forbidden by Rabbinical edict.

This puts the

prohibition in a different category:
The dispute concerning the classification of the
nature of the stricture against abortion is of more
than mere speculative interest.
It will be shown that
various determinations regarding permissibility of
therapeutic abortion in certain situations hinge
directly upon proper categorization of this
problem.35
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That is,

a Rabbinic edict which may be more easily

suspended than a prohibition falling under some related but
Biblical command.
Viewing this discussion in Cordozo's terms,

it seems that

abortion is a prohibition in search of a precedent.

Yet Bleich

insists that our not knowing the nature of the prohibition "in
no way mitigates the odius nature of the act."

Section 3.

Principles Derived from Other Branches of Law

Feldman has written:
A firm and direct legal basis in the classic sources
has still not been discovered which would
unequivocally label abortion on request as
impermissible.
Perhaps then evidence for the
existence of at least an implied prohibition can be
deduced from another area of Jewish law.37
This section deals with such a broad method of analogy,
where precedents are found in "distant"

fields of the law and

interpreted to yield very broad principles.
A.

Treatment of

the Terminally Ill

Jewish law is particularly strict with regards to rules
pertaining to the end of

life.

One may not hasten the death of

a terminally ill patient even if he is in pain and wishes to
die.38

These rulings are often cited as evidence for

establishing the absolute or infinite value of
law.

life in Jewish

This seems a benign and quite a natural deduction from

the precedent

law on the terminally ill.

Yet by our analysis

the principle being abstracted is so broad as to be capable of
multiple,

very distinct meanings.

What one means by "infinite
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value" or "absolute" value becomes clear only in the kind of
application of this principle that given authors will make.
For the stringent orthodox position, we can apply this
principle to the fetus and conclude that abortion is
forbidden.

Moreover,

they deduce in particular that abortion

for fetal indications is never justified because any life is
infinitely and absolutely more valuable than no life.
shall see later,

many of these authors prohibit abortion even

for the most serious genetic diseases.
absolute value of
quality of

As we

The principle of the

life thus ends up completely eliminating

life considerations from religious discourse.

Referring to Tay-Sachs disease,
established that quality of

Bleich states

"It is well

life to be anticipated if the fetus

is carried to term is not itself sufficient reason for the
performance of abortion."

39

We can object on two levels:

First,

to apply rules

intended for a terminally ill adult to the fetus begs the whole
question of the status or personhood of the fetus.
accept that a terminally ill patient’s

Even if we

life has absolute or

infinite value, what justifies extending this to the fetus?
Second is that it is possible to understand the laws regarding
terminally ill as a traditional concern with the weak and
helpless,

as measures to protect persons from neglect and abuse

as Green has written.

The tradition is then seen to have a

great and abiding concern for all sorts of
issues.

When the tradition is rigorous

"quality of

life"

"it is a rigor always

in the service of understandable human values.

40

V.
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B.

The Special Role of Healing
In discussing the special role that healing has in the

Halakha, we are in a situation similar to the previous one.
All authors agree on this broad principle,
we find they mean opposite things.

but in applying it

Jakobovitz points out that

Every religious system has recognized the inner
conflict between the essentially divine and
providential character of disease and the human
efforts through medical treatment to mitigate or
frustrate its effects.41
In an attempt to resolve this dilemma,

the Talmud in Bava

Kamma 85a quotes the Bible:
And if men quarrel with one another and one smiteth
the other with a stone or with the fist and he does
not die but keep his bed ... He must pay the loss
entailed by absence from work and cause him to be
thoroughly healed.
[Exodus 21:18-19]
The Talmud concludes from this that the physician is
granted permission to cure.

In a Midrashic source,

the

physician is compared to the farmer:
Drugs and medicaments are the fertilizer and the
physician is the tiller of soil.
Just as if one does
not weed fertilize and plow the trees will not produce
fruit . . . but will die, so with regard to the
body.42
As Jakobovitz43 has pointed out,

these passages represent

quite distinct approaches to the dilemma of disease and divine
will.

In the first,

the Talmud seeks specific authorization or

dispensation allowing the physician to interfere in the disease
process which is somehow divinely ordained.

In the second

passage,

Health,

wealth,

disease is seen as part of nature.

like

is something man/woman is supposed to work at.

specific medical dispensation is needed.

No

Both positions have

been maintained throughout much of Halakhic history.
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Bleich attempts an interesting synthesis of these views.
He agrees with the analogy made in the latter Midrash but not
because tilling the soil is an obvious instance of a natural
right that man has.

Rather,

the opposite is true.

The analogy

views :
therapeutic intervention as a contravention of divine
will and application of medicaments as illicit
interference with the natural processes of the human
body which is the chattel of God.
Indeed this is so,
but by the same token fields and vineyards are the
property of God as well and man has no natural right
to till the soil or to pluck the fruits . . . Man may
do so not as a matter of right but by virtue of
specific divine dispensation.
Man is similarly
granted dispensation to practice the medical arts.44
The specific dispensation which allows the tilling of the
soil is

"with the sweat of your brow shall you eat bread."

[Genesis 3:19]

This dispensation simultaneously gives man the

right to struggle with Nature and instructs man not to rely on
divine intervention for his sustenance or health.

Bleich seems

to be saying that everything that isn't specifically allowed is
prohibited.

We will argue later that,

in fact,

this belief

does inform his and other stringent orthodox authors'

approach

to Jewish law.
There are a multitude of other Biblical,

Talmudic and other

Halakhic references to the special nature of healing
our discussion,

45

For

what is important is the application of the

principle that healing is permitted,

in fact required by Jewish

law.
As we have seen,

the stringent orthodox camp actually uses

this principle to restrict abortion to life threatening
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situations.

Medical need becomes a very tightly defined

concept which never gets extended to other sorts of need or
quality of

life considerations.

The more lenient camp might argue that this is a distortion
of a

life-giving principle intended for the promotion of the

well being of individuals.

That,

furthermore,

quality of

life

issues are not excluded but implied by the Halakhic view of
healing.

The dispensation or command to heal,

to actively

intervene with natural and divine forces can also be used as a
precedent for allowing abortion.

To argue,

as many have,

every pregnancy is God's will and a blessing,

that

is simply

inconsistent with the meaning of these principles concerning
man's proper attitude towards nature and providence.
C.

The Centrality of Procreation
In considering the role of medical healing or the treatment

of the terminally ill the stringent camp has extracted a
principle that sets the preservation of
considerations of its quality.
out,

life over any

As Lubarsky

46

has pointed

to this camp the laws describing procreative obligations

will be understood as instances of the same principles,
similar ones.

Namely,

that increasing

life,

or

as well as

preserving already extant

life is a central obligation.

Moreover,

the increase of

life takes priority over its

quality.

That this is the intent of the stringent position can

be seen in the following:
Purely social or economic reasons, let alone
considerations of sheer convenience, would never be
regarded as valid indication for the artificial

of
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frustration of the act and duty of procreation.
For
legal purposes, i.e. to override or modify religious
law, Judaism would therefore not unreservedly accept
the World Health Organization definition of health as
a state of physical, mental and social well being.
While it naturally seeks to promote the social health
of society and its members by numerous laws and
enactments designed to advance human welfare, social
and economic considerations by themselves do not
automatically suspend religious or moral imperative in
the same way as purely medical factors do.4'
The diverse laws concerning medical healing,
the terminally ill,

procreation,

contraception and abortion are

all understood by the stringent camp as

indicating the selfsame

principle that an increase in the quantity of
value and takes priority over quality of
other religious obligations.
least,

D.

Moreover,

life is a central

life or even over
for this principle at

all forms of human life are equivalent.

to these points

treatment of

We shall return

later in this chapter.

A Consistent and Systematic Bias
In the last two sections, we cited many of the numerous

sources and cases which are used as precedents for the abortion
discussion in the Halakha.
abortion,
law.

Some have dealt directly with

others have been in quite distinct areas of Jewish

We have tried to indicate that in every instance there

are alternative ways to draw principles directly relevant to
abortion from these materials.
believe,

The stringent camp has, we

systematically rejected all of the lenient

implications for abortion that is inherent in so many of these
precedents,

and has consistently forced a restrictive principle

out of these materials.

In the next section, we will discuss a

possible source of bias in the underlying belief system of this
camp.

'
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Section 4.

Theological and Philosophical Assumptions

We would like to locate at

least part of the source of bias

discussed above in underlying assumptions,
attitudes.

These are the forces,

when reasons are nicely balanced,
will fall."

beliefs and

as Cordozo writes,

"which,

must determine where choice

48
°

Lubarsky has referred to what she calls "extra Halakhic
principles

.

.

. which are preestablished ethical perspectives

which are then validated by seeking corroborative texts."

49

These then are the philosophical and theological assumptions
which one brings to the reading of a text or adjudication of a
case.

It is especially important to excavate these in the case

of the stringent orthodox authors because of their repeated
insistence that such philosophical categories are not involved
in their exegesis.
Lubarsky50 and Green51 have discussed the "assumptions"
or "bases" upon which they feel the stringent camp is
grounded.

We would like to take this analysis a little further

and find philosophical and theological presuppositions which
are deeply imbedded and not clearly articulated.

We believe

that a fundamental disagreement about these basic categories is
responsible for the difficulty of creating a dialogue across
the differing sides
Jewish thought.
level.

in the abortion discussion even within

What is

lacking is a common language at this

We agree with Cordozo's comment that these assumptions

are often subconscious - not in the psychoanalytic sense,
in the "breathing"
not examined.

but

sense that they are taken for granted and
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A.

The Meaning and Value of Life
Much of the debate about abortion involves comparisons

between the fetus and an adult person.

The arguments often

turn on defining the "essential" properties of being an adult
person and showing that the fetus does or does not share these
essential properties and is therefore entitled or not to
certain kinds of treatment.
life,"

"absolute value of

Phrases such as

life," or

"sanctity of

"infinite value of

life"

must be understood in the context of what they mean vis-a-vis
an adult person before we can apply them to the fetus.

Indeed,

this is why the abortion debate is often so difficult.

It

requires us to question what we mean by the "value of

life"

and

forces us to question the worth and meaning of our existence.
The philosopher Paul Edwards,
work of Kurt Baier,

basing his discussion on the

distinguishes two senses in which people

use the phrase "meaning and value of
the "cosmic" sense.

life."

This refers to belief

One sense he calls
in a "superhuman

intelligence that has fashioned human beings to

.

.

.

serve

, ..52
some end.
A specific example of this

"cosmic"

sense is also referred

to by the Jewish theologian Emile Fackenheim:
Whatever meaning life acquires is derived from the
encounter between God and man.
The meaning thus
conferred upon human life cannot be understood in
terms of some finite human purpose supposedly more
ultimate than the meeting itself.
For what could be
more ultimate than the presence of God?53
The other sense in which Edwards discusses the meaning and
value of

life he calls the "terrestrial":
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. . . not concerned with cosmic issues but with the
question whether certain purposes are to be found in
[sic] this life.
Thus most of us would say without
hesitation that a person's life had meaning if we knew
that he devoted himself to a cause [for example] . . .
He will justify his devotion in terms of the
production of happiness and the reduction of suffering
. . . It is sufficient that he should have some [such]
attachments.54
In both the senses mentioned by Edwards,
meaning of

life is related to some goal,

terrestrial or divine and cosmic.
life that gives it value.

the value and

be it human and

It is what happens within a

Another way of viewing this is to

understand references to life as the context or container,
prerequisite condition for other values.
has a primary value,
values.

Life in this sense

but that value proceeds from other

Yet this analysis is not complete.

sense of the value of

These phrases,

life" or the "sanctity of

as used in the abortion discussion,

to refer to something intrinsic,
religious,

Even the "cosmic"

life fails to capture what the stringent

orthodox mean by "absolute value of
life."

the

not dependent on goals,

seem

even

"cosmic" goals.

The philosopher Martin Golding confirms our need for
another category of value without being able to supply it, when
he writes:
It is difficult, of course, to think of life as an
aspirational value ... I suggest that another kind
of gradation is needed to reflect the view of the
tradition.
Perhaps a gradation of supremacy.
It is a
fundamental Halakhic principle that regard for
imperiled life suspends the whole Torah . . . The
value of human lives then cannot be expressed merely
in terms of the strength of the prohibition against
taking life.
This value has supremacy that goes
beyond its being a condition for the realization of
higher values.^
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We would like to propose that when many stringent orthodox
authors refer to the "value" of
of

life,

they are often speaking

"life" not as man's existence but as God’s property.

central image is that
safeguarded.

life belongs to God and must therefore be

Whatever values man may find within his

life itself is never his.
treated as an "infinite"
this sense the value of
life,

and that

The

Yet,

as God's property,

and "absolute" value.

life,

the

it must be

Notice that in

life is independent of the quality of

in this sense also,

all human lives are of equal

value.
The philosopher Stephen Dixon has made reference to the
same idea,

although he locates it in the Old Testament.

Whatever belongs to God is sacred by definition
because and only because it belongs to him.
Therefore
sanctity in the Biblical sense of the word should not
be used either to designate that which unites all
. . . persons, nor as a designator for humane
treatment of all living things.
Life was considered
God's property and he was free to do with it as he
willed.
"I kill and I make alive; I wound and I
heal." [Deuteronomy 32:39] . . . Rights and sanctity
of life are foreign to each other.5°
With this as background,

we suggest that the underlying

philosophical and theological assumptions of the stringent
orthodox position are rooted in a dual notion of the nature of
human life.

First,

human life belonging to God has intrinsic

value which is independent of man's experience.
duty,

then,

is to treasure and safeguard life which has been

entrusted to him.
duty.

Man's first

This takes precedent over almost every other

There is a tendency,

given this belief,

life with physiological survival.

For,

to equate human

if man's experience of
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his

life does not in the first place determine the worth of

that life,
absent.
life.

neither can it determine whether

Thus,
It may,

in being rigorous,
at first,

life is present or

one must safeguard all human

seem paradoxical that such a strongly

theological view leads to so concrete a definition of
is it clear that this is

logically necessary,

these ideas are often linked.
we cannot at this

level of

between different

lives.

but

life,

nor

it seems that

It also follows immediately that

life’s value draw distinctions
All share this form of

"value"

equally.
Second,

life is also understood to have value as a context

for fulfillment of religious duties.
"cosmic sense”
God.

It has value in Edwards'

as the stage for the encounter between man and

It seems,

however,

that to the stringent orthodox

position this encounter is defined by religious duty and only
this duty has value.

Religious

laws are obligatory regardless

of their consequences for human welfare.
duties define that welfare.
quality of

religious

When conflicts arise between

life and religious duty,

of the religious duty.

In fact,

they are resolved in favor

The scheme is extremely simplified yet

it has a good deal of explanatory power,

as we shall see in the

next subsection.
B.

Consequences of the Assumptions
Jakobovitz has written with regard to disallowing

euthanasia that every human life has

"infinite value.

by definition is indispensable so that any fraction of
whether ten years or a minute, whether healthy,

Infinity
life

crippled or
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even unconscious remains equally infinite in value."57

We

can understand Jakobovitz's comment in the context of our
scheme.

A terminally ill conscious person may choose not to

attach any value to his
Nevertheless,

his

life has value in the cosmic sense.

Halibord comments,
rational
repent."
life,

life in Edward’s terrestrial sense.

"survival here

[need]

As

include conscious

life of only a few seconds sufficient to enable him to
58

Thus,

regardless of a person’s valuation of his

as

long as there is a possibility of conscious rational

thought,

there is infinite value to his life as a context for

this encounter with God.

Notice also that as long as a person

is capable of this encounter his
or potential duration,

life,

regardless of its pain

is of equal worth to any other person's

since it is only these encounters that are of
begin with.

real value to

Yet Jakobovitz is saying more than this and

includes the terminally unconscious patient’s
infinite value.

life as also of

To understand this, we must draw on our first

assumption and understand that even such a mere physiological
survival

is,

it is God’s.

according to this view,

of infinite value because

There may be dispensation for man to take

responsibility for his own fields and health,
take over the responsibility of one's

life or its end.

Consider now the concept of murder.

It can be understood

in our scheme as a crime on three levels.
level it

but one can never

is a crime against the victim;

At the most obvious

on a second

represents a destruction of a context for worship;
is a diminution of

life,

God's property.

Abortion,

level
lastly,
by

it
it

90

comparison,
first

probably cannot be seen as similar to murder at the

level.

However,

it remains a crime on the third level.

Certainly feticide is a diminution of human physiological
and as such is exclusively God’s prerogative.
one agrees that the fetus is not a person,
feticide is not a crime against any one,
against God.

Thus,

life

even if

in the sense that

it is still a crime

Steinberg has written:

Human life is of the utmost value in Jewish philosophy
and law.
This basic viewpoint is transferred to fetal
life as well, therefore abortion is fundamentally
forbidden.59
We consider next the ruling that when life is in peril all
religious

laws are suspended.

According to our scheme, we

should expect to find two reasons for this suspension of
religious

law.

First,

life as God's property has a special

value which takes priority over other religious duty,
Sabbath.

e.g.

the

For our first religious duty is to preserve and

increase life.

Second,

religious duties,

seen as a context for fulfilling other

the preservation of the context naturally

takes priority.
Without explaining the reason Halibord has noted that the
Talmud in Yoma 85a in fact does give two distinct reasons why
the Sabbath may be desecrated to save a

life:

The first is that it is logical to profane one Sabbath
to save a life so that he can keep [observe] other
Sabbaths.
The second is a deduction from the verse.60
The verse reads "...
[Leviticus 18:5]
other religious

Thou shall

and we deduce that
laws.

live by them [the laws]"

life takes priority over

The first reason given by Halibord is
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precisely what we expected when considering

life a context for

worship.

The deduction from the passage may also parallel our

notion of

life as God's prerogative.

Recall that the

exceptions to this rule are the circumstances in which one must
lose one's
incest.

life rather than transgress:

idolatry,

murder and

Each of these can be seen to destroy the possibility

of life being a context for worship or encounter with God.

The

point we wish to stress is that danger to life is a special
category because of the nature of the value of

life.

It also becomes clear why danger to maternal

life also

constitutes a special and unique circumstance under which
abortion is permitted.
mother's

The conflict here is between the

life and the fetal

precedent over fetal

life.

The mother's

life because her

life takes

life is valued both for

being God’s and in the sense of a context of worship.
fetus'

has only the former sort of value.

The

Notice however that

the life of the fetus does have priority over any other
religious

law,

extension,

its

e.g. we violate the Sabbath for it.
life has precedent over any other

By

"terrestrial"

value as well.
We can now understand why the stringent position cannot
extend the permissive criteria for abortion from maternal
health to other more general forms of maternal well being as
the more lenient camps have advocated.
medical

Peril to life and

intervention are categories that depend on the very

nature of the value of
categories.

life.

In our scheme,

One cannot extend these
it makes no sense to argue that if
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a woman's health is sufficient cause for abortion then so is
economic or other need.
a health problem."61

As Bleich remarks,

"Grave need is not

Similarly Rosner comments,

convenience more valuable than a potential

"Why is her

life?"62

We can also better understand a more difficult position
taken by the stringent orthodox camp.

The ruling that fetal

indications never in themselves justify an abortion.

Thus

Jakobovitz:
This prohibition against abortion would stand even if
it were certain that the child would be born deformed
just as it is forbidden to kill a crippled person.6^
Similarly,

Bleich:

It is well established that quality of life to be
anticipated if the fetus is carried to term is not
itself sufficient reason for the performance of an
abortion.
The status of abnormal and deformed human
beings is well defined in Halakha.
Physical or mental
abnormality do not affect the human status of the
individual.
And Rosner:
To eliminate Tay-Sachs disease by selective abortion
is unacceptable in traditional Judaism.
Recourse to
abortion in circumstances where the unborn fetus is
determined to have Tay-Sachs disease is not
permissible in Jewish law.65
Fetal indications do not suffice to allow for an abortion.
Since the only truly important values are those having to do
with religious duty and the encounter with God.
person who can participate to whatever extent
has a

life context as valuable as anyone else.

Any living

in this encounter
Just as we may

not distinguish between two adults on the basis of deformity so
may we not distinguish between fetuses on this basis.

Finally,

even if it were to be determined that the fetus would never
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have consciousness,

never have a life,

called a context for worship.

that is,

that would be

Its life is still something

belonging to God and must be protected.
C.

Summary
In this section we have presented a '’possible'*

set of basic

philosophical-theological beliefs that could in part account
for the systematic bias seen in the stringent orthodox
interpretation of abortion Halakha.

We do not underestimate

the difficulty in determining what someone else's
unacknowledged biases are.

Nor are we in any way advocating

that these philosophical-theological assumptions are somehow
"authentic"

to the Jewish tradition.

On the contrary, we see

these assumptions as extra-Ha1akhic and as

limiting the

interpretation of Halakha along one narrow path.
correct,

however,

If Cordozo is

one must have some predetermined attitudes

and be biased in some direction.

We prefer a different set of

biases as we shall discuss in the concluding chapter.

Section 5.

The Method of Sociology - The Halakhist as

Leais1ator
In addition to the philosophical-theological
presuppositions the views of the restrictive camp have also
been influenced by certain agenda which we feel are outside of
the Halakhic framework,

but whose influence contributes to the

particular bias of this camp.
issues very briefly.

We will discuss a few of these
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A♦

The Slippery Slope
Bleich states:

"It is instructive to note that

historically societies that condoned abortion invariably
practiced infanticide as well."^

Similarly,

Carmy writes,

"No defense of abortion on demand has been produced that would
fail to justify infanticide as well.
that if we allow abortion ".
follow?

Legal euthanasia?

.

,,67

. will

And Rosner fears

legal infanticide

Legal genocide?"

68

The principle of a "slippery slope” or "edge of the wedge"
is well known in Halakha where it is called qeder - fence.
puts up legal

fences,

forbidding actions that are not

necessarily wrong in themselves,
laws.

Yet

One

to protect very cherished

in regards to feticide recall that the Mishna

concerning the difficult
between fetus and infant,
the moment after.

labor draws a clear distinction
between the moment before birth and

Perhaps in its wisdom,

the Mishna felt that

this boundary was so basic that there was no danger of having
it crossed.
B.

Response to Genocide
The emotional

reference to the Holocaust

in the previous

quote by Rosner is a very common occurrence in the contemporary
literature on abortion and is especially poignant in the Jewish
literature.

The reference to the Holocaust is made in two

different arguments.
slippery slope.

The first argument is related to the

The Holocaust is taken as evidence or a

warning concerning the loss of
century.

reverence for

Every act that can be construed as

life in the 20th
lacking in that

V
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reverence leads us into dangerous waters.

In addition,

these

arguments usually make reference to a concern about eugenics
and abortion being used for such ends.

Although there is

certainly some merit in many of these arguments,

the particular

reference to the Holocaust has more emotional appeal than
logical force.

Jewish authors,

in particular,

need to be very

sensitive not to misuse such references to win emotional
support for their arguments.
A second argument making reference to the Holocaust is made
with respect to a perceived need for the Jewish people to
"replenish the calamitous losses sustained in the Nazi
Holocaust with the destruction of one third of
people."

69

[the Jewish]

It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter

into the complex discussion of demographic ethics.
merely note that

it

We would

is unclear how increasing the Jewish

population in any way "replenishes"
pain of the Holocaust.

the loss or responds to the

Clearly this is not the only or even

the most sensitive response and certainly it has
with the Halakhic view of abortion.
of the Holocaust requires that

little to do

Sensitivity to the issue

it not be used indiscriminately

to stir emotional response where it is not logically relevant.
C.

Institutional Considerations
Green and Sinclair have argued that the most restrictive

orthodox view:
... is traceable to the desire on the part of many
orthodox scholars to demonstrate that on matters of
sexual and moral concern Judaism is no less stringent
and no less rigorous in its views than are the most
conservative Catholic or Protestant teachings.
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Moreover,

Green argues that the strictest orthodox position

may have arisen from an institutional need to distinguish a
stance that represents a sign of contradiction to the more
liberal attitudes in Judaism.

This

leads to interpreting the

Halakha with a distinct anti-modern perspective.
Feldman has made a similar observation:
. . . contemporary Rabbis evoke not the more lenient
but the more stringent responsa of the earlier
authorities.
The more permissive decisions they point
out were in any case rendered against the background
of greater instinctual hesitation to resort to
abortion.
Against today's background of more casual
abortion Rabbis are moving closer to the position
associated with Maimonides and Unterman allowing
abortion only for the gravest of reasons.
If these institutional considerations are indeed at work it
would be most unfortunate.

In an attempt to demonstrate that

Halakha can be just as stringent as other denominations,
would lose what was special about Halakha.
we began this paper with,

we

We would lose what

as MacIntyre wrote,

"a clear

statement of what difference it makes to be a Jew or Christian
or a Moslem .

.

.

or a secular thinker.”
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In an attempt to

define sectarian institutional boundaries and turfs, we also
lose the unique perspectives of the Halakha on important
issues.
has

The Halakha is neither conservative nor

liberal,

but

its own complex views gained over centuries which often

surprises those who are honest enough to read it with open eyes.

^

Chapter VII
Conclusion

Throughout this paper we have concentrated on a critique of
the stringent orthodox position.

We have been interested in

refuting the correlation claim and simultaneously in
understanding the source and structure of the stringent
orthodox position,

both from its own view and from a more

critical perspective.

In the process, we have come to

understand how important a role legalistic thinking plays for
this particular position.

We introduced a critical

legal

framework for demonstrating the complexity in any so-called
purely legalistic methodology and demonstrated how systematic
bias and non-Halakhic assumption and goals have contributed to
the actual formulation of this camp's positions.

We have shown

that there has been not a single but multiple authentic
Halakhic views on abortion for fifteen centuries and there are
authentic "descendents" of the more permissive school of
thought active today.

We can no longer speak about the Jewish

position on abortion.

Rather, we must refer to the Halakhic

"debate,"

"dialogue" or "discussion" on abortion.

In concluding, we would like to recall two important
questions that were raised in the Introduction:

1) What are

the issues and methods of discourse that are important
Halakhic discussion of abortion;

in the

2) What contribution can this

Halakhic discussion make to the contemporary debate on

,
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abortion.

In this chapter, we will discuss how our results

reflect on these questions.

Section 1:

The Correlation Claim Revisited

We have shown that the correlation claim does not hold up
under careful scrutiny.
religious

Abortion is unlike many simpler

issues in which the Halakha is clear.

instances,

In those

perhaps the rigoristic position can rightfully claim

that its stance is based on strict adherence to the letter of
the Halakha.

No single simple formulation,

however,

can cover

the complexity of the abortion issue and the Halakha reflects
this truth by preserving multiple views on abortion.

The

Halakha reflects the differences of opinion that have always
accompanied the issue even within its own strictly religious
borders.
Stienberg is incorrect in his assessment that "the overall
Jewish perspective is anti-abortion."^
wrong in claiming that,
Court

.

.

.

Brickner is equally

"Jewish law agrees with the Supreme

Judaism permits abortion."

2

Rather the Halakha

has preserved a debate between a somewhat restrictive and a
more permissive position.

The Halakha continues to struggle

with this issue today as it has for centuries.

A position more

lenient than the stringent orthodox position has begun to
emerge in the English language literature as we have seen.
This position can find an "ancestry"
stringent position.
Halakha

in the Halakha as can the

Yet neither reflects the total view of the

in this issue.

I
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The fact that the Halakha has preserved for millenia a
legitimately religious school of thought that was permissive
with regard to abortion is of significance to the larger
contemporary debate on abortion.

The claim is often put

forward by those opposed to abortion that the Judeo-Christian
tradition is

likewise fundamentally opposed to abortion,

and

that this opposition has always been a basic tenent of western
monotheism.

An attempt is made to identify the anti-abortion

position with a religious or Godly outlook while identifying
the more permissive positions with secularism and -modernism."
This argument

is analogous to the correlation claim in that it

correlates being
We can call

"truly"

religious with being anti-abortion.

it the general correlation claim.

The long history of a permissive school of thought on
abortion within Halakhic Judaism puts these claims

in doubt.

Since reasonable religious scholars have disagreed about
abortions and the status of the fetus,

there is clearly nothing

about the fundamentals of the Judeo-Christian belief system
that makes

it necessarily opposed to abortion.

This result is

not very widely understood and still surprises many scholars
and researchers.
abortion,

A.

In a study on religion and opposition to

Lewis Rhodes,

surveying college freshmen,

correlation between religious preferences,
religious services,

found a

attendance at

and opposition to abortion.

3

Rhodes

finds that 62 percent of Mormons and 60 percent of Roman
Catholics opposed legalized abortion while only 6 percent of
Unitarians and 12 percent of Jews oppose legalization.
in an attempt to explain these latter results states:

Rhodes
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Assuming that religion is a basic force in
formation of a world view, one might
attribute the pro-abortion attitudes of
Unitarians, Jews, Quakers or Episcopalians to
a cosmopolitan tolerance and humanistic
respect for individual choice.
Such
tolerance and humanism may be reinforced by
concentration of such religious members in
the most liberal region in the United States,
the East.
Also, the mothers of subjects in
these religions are better educated."4
Rhodes explains the results for Jews,

Unitarians and

Quakers be referring to factors outside religious beliefs.

He

does not consider the possibility that it may be a religious
choice to be pro-legalized abortion.

This is not uncommon,

people who are permissive with regard to abortion rarely
realize that there is a religious precedent for this stance.
Perhaps this indicates how widely the general correlation claim
is accepted,

and how religious concepts have often been

misrepresented by forces opposed to legalized abortion.

A

major contribution that Halakha could thus make to the abortion
debate is to force all of us to re-examine our often simplistic
assumption about religion in relation to the abortion issue.

Section 2:

The Mother's Life Takes Precedence

In speaking of
abortion,

we do not

"multiple authentic" Halakhic views on
intent to give the impression that any

position can find Halakhic precedent.

There are definite

limits to the spectrum of acceptable views.

In particular all

Jewish scholars currently agree and have agreed for fifteen
centuries that the life of the mother takes precedence over the
fetus.

Given the status of women during most of these

*
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centuries,

this is a significant ruling.

to be treated as an individual.
secondary,
potential

her actual

The mother is clearly

Her role as childbearer is

life takes precedence over the fetus's

life.

This ruling differed with the Catholic position for many
centuries.

Yet the importance of this distinction has been

under-appreciated by Jews and Gentiles alike.
stringent Orthodox Jews,

Even for those

authors who would permit abortion only

to save the life of the mother,

this ruling is still different

in important ways from the Catholic position.

This difference

represents the Halakhic contribution to ethical thought on this
issue.

It is therefore important that these differences be

more widely appreciated.

Moreover,

it is difficult to

understand the rationale of certain stringent orthodox authors
who have aligned themselves with the Catholic church to fight
against abortion.
Jewish position,

5

This is certainly not the "authentic"

and it undermines the distinctive contribution

that the Halaka can make to the debate;

namely that it does

differ from the Catholic position in an important way,
the mother's

Section 3:

and that

life always takes precedent over a fetus.

The Lenient Halakhic Position

We have already made many references to the contemporary
lenient Halakhic position on abortion.

We have argued that

this position can certainly find authentic "ancestry" within
the traditional Halakha.
that it

From our vantage point, we recognize

is one of the continuous voices preserved by the
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Halakha in each of its epochs.

We will here briefly describe

this position in light of our analysis.
Representatives of this position include Green^,
Greenberg,

7

Biale,

8

and others.

While recognizing the

seriousness of every decision to abort a pregnancy,
position would allow abortion for severe fatal
for maternal consideration such as social,
planning

issues.

Along these lines,

can we retain the principles of

this

indications and

economic and family

Greenberg has asked,

reverence for

"How

life which are

built into the Halakha while yet widening the ground for
abortion."

9

This position recognizes the same elements in Halakha but
tends to interpret them in understandable human terms.
Green explains it,
is

"a rigor

As

even when the tradition has been harsh,

it

in the service of understandable human

values."10

There is a greater sense of a conventional

relationship with God rather than an authoritarian
relationship.

Thus its approach to Halakha assumes that the

tradition is concerned with the well being of persons and the
quality of their

lives.

There is a

"humanistic intentionality

to many of the fundamental teachings."11
for healing the Halakha

The special mandate

is taken as evidence for its overall

concern with the experiences of persons and the quality of
their

lives.

Procreation is viewed as only one part of the

Halakhic mandate concerning the loving and sexual nature of
marriage.

The rules concerning the terminally will are seen as

affording protection to the weak rather than forcing the
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continuation of pain.
•

•

In Green's words,

these laws "were

•

elaborated initially to protect human beings from cruelty."

12

If we examine the basic beliefs of this position concerning
the nature of Halakha we find that there is again a strong
interdependence between the belief structure and the method of
interpreting Halakha.

The exigetical approach of these authors

falls under Cordoza’s heading "The Method of History."
might call

it a contextual moral analysis.

We

It involves a

sensitivity to the context in which a ruling was made.

The

focus is placed on the moral dilemma faced by the Halakha given
the existing set of social and historical conditions.

The

principles they abstract from these precedents derive from how
the moral dilemma
condemned woman,

is resolved.

For example,

in the case of the

the Halakhic principle extracted does not

involve capital punishment nor does it concern the father's
property rights to his wife’s fetus.
case are not

in question.

These elements of the

They are the given social context.

We must accept them to understand the moral dilemma under
consideration.

In this case,

the dilemma is whether a

condemned mother's comfort outweighs the father's right to the
fetus and the life of the fetus itself.
talmud rules that

it does.

As we have seen,

the

This approach avoids simply

applying rules whose original context and meaning have
changed.

This position,

for example, would warn us to be

"sensitive to the radical new situations medical technology has
created.

..13
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We find this position very attractive.

It does not ask us

to reject Halakha or even to change it nor does it blindly
apply rules elaborated in completely different social
contexts.

Rather it preserves the ethical core of Halakhic

decisions and attempts to apply them in the contemporary
context.
A prominent aspect of context in which the Halakha has been
established has been the dominant role of men in the social,
economic and religious arenas.

It seems fair to assume that

since all the Halakhic decision makers have been men,

Cordozo

would have predicted a source of systematic bias in this
group's rulings.

We would especially expect this to be true

with regard to abortion issue that affects women so much more
immediately than it does men.

In this regard, we have seen

that the Halakha often stresses the individuality of the mother
and the predominance of her
role as childbearer.

life and interest over that of her

We can clearly see in these ruling the

traditional tendency to protect the weak,
from abuse.

in this case woman,

Yet the role of woman within the Halakha has often

been secondary to that of men.

We are just now beginning to

see the emergence of a feminist critique of Halakha in general
and on the abortion question in particular.

The introduction

of knowledgable women Halakhists into the discussion on
abortion will not only eliminate the male sources of systematic
bias,

but open fresh perspectives on the traditional

As Rachel Biale writes:

rulings.
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The Halakha as it is presently constituted
does not accept women as equal to men despite
orthodox apologies to the contrary.
But even
as we reject the traditional view of woman in
favor of equality, we need not reject the
Halakhic framework.
We must revolutionize
the view of woman within the Halakha but that
very process will necessarily revolutionize
the Halakha itself.14
The lenient Halakhic position and its newest sector,
feminist Halakhic position,

the

are involved in the struggle to

maintain the ethical core of the tradition while recognizing
the uniqueness of the contemporary context.

These authors have

recognized the need to balance an awareness of contemporary
circumstances with a deep trust for the ethical insights of the
past as preserved in the tradition.

The formulations that have

and will emerge from this synthesis serve as a model for how
the larger abortion debate might begin to resolve its dual
attachments to past mores and present social realities.

Section 4:

The Underlying Belief Systems

With the help of Cardozo's framework, we have been able to
examine the stringent coup's method of

interpreting the

Halakhic precedents concerning abortion.

We were able to

demonstrate a consistent and systematic bias in those
interpretations.

In the last chapter, we attempted to

formulate one possible set of underlying beliefs and goals that
would account for this bias.

An important

result from this

analysis was the realization that the debate within the Halakha
resolved around conflicting philosophica1-theologica1 beliefs
and social goals.

What sometimes appeared to be argumentation
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based on proof text citation and quoting authority is in fact a
deeply ideological discourse involving fundamental belief
structures.
acknowledged,

These underlying beliefs are not always
however.

As an example, we have seen how complex

the notion of the "sanctity of

life"

is,

and the fact that

is

used by different groups to refer to fundamentally different
belief systems.
There is an important lesson in this for the larger debate
on abortion.

It is the recognition that what appear to be the

issues under discussion may not

in fact be the real issues that

motivate the various positions.

To discover these and make

them manifest, we must first notice the biases or blind spots
of a particular position and then attempt to reconstruct what
the source of this bias is in terms of philosophicaltheological beliefs,

social goals,

etc.

The major obstacle to

better communication between the various parties to this debate
is the fact that what is really at issue is often left unsaid
and unacknowledged as each side takes these assumptions for
granted.

For example, what appears to be a discussion about

the nature and status of the fetus may turn out in reality to
be about sexuality,
society,

the meaning of family,

or God's perogative over

the role of woman in

life and death

The better

we understand the real sources of the various opinions and
their biases,

the better we will be able to make truly ethical

and informed choices.
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Section

5:

Afterword:

We will
Rachel

The Halakha

close with

a

few thoughts

on the Halakhic process.

Biale writes:
In order to understand what puzzle and
concerns us in the present, we must turn to
the past even though it may at first be more
confusing, obscure and alien than our
present.

Perhaps
and

of

the nature of

itself

forces

contain

a

The Halakha
dilemmas

arise,

serve

this

purpose,

abstraction begets

fixed points

for

the process,
is

this

Way."
front

the ethics

of

fits
we

law we

are

us.

the Halakha

are

free

to

keep contact with

change

and new moral
in the

systems

do not

are contained
laws.

into

derived
a

ethical

or

that

is
past

us

also

systems

supplies

the boundary

supply and

resupply the

What

is

essential

and

keeps

path

as

being

past

us

from the Hebrew word

reminds
it

Within these

a dialogue with our

"way”

in

speculate on ethical

We must

keeps us

and

recording

re-interpreted;

The Halakha

system.

The Halakha

along The Way already
must

of

think of

it

abstraction.

forced

is

in

in the past.

Ethical

too easily

frame.

that

by

to be grounded

these boundary points.

"Halakha”

We often
of

is

not

Instead,

the past

situations

governed by concrete case

dialogue

The word

and

continuity.

further

an ethical

system that

is

they are

fit within this

points

as

what we need most

what we need most

acts

it does

framework.

the present

that

past,

concrete

that

in concrete cases what was done

recognizes

Instead,

is

broad ethical

a dialogue between

and preserving

that

the Halakha

is

and

anchored.
for

"The

laid out

in

that we have traveled
laid out

as we move

behind us.

forward.

We

it
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